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1Introduction
In the years preceding the War of Chioggia, Venetian foreign affairs were 
dominated by conflicts with Genoa. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, the two powers often clashed in open hostilities. This antagonism 
between the cities lasted for ten generations, and has been compared to the 
earlier rivalry between Rome and Carthage.
Like the struggle between the two ancient powers, the Venetian/Gcnoan 
hatred stemmed from their competitive relationship in maritime trade.
Unlike land-based rivals, sea powers cannot be separated by any natural 
boundary or agree to observe any territorial spheres of influence. Trade with 
the Levant, a source of great wealth and prosperity for each of the cities, 
required Venice and Genoa to come into repeated conflict in ports such as 
Chios, Lajazzo, Acre, and Tyre. Efforts at negotiation did not produce any 
lasting results, and statesmen like Petrarch concluded that "inevitably, of 
Italy’s two Eyes, one will be put out, the other dimmed." ^
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Venice and Genoa repeatedly 
clashed, each trying to destroy its rival. This paper will look at the historical 
events which shaped this era of the major hostilities between the two powers. 
The author will look at factors such as battles, diplomatic efforts, and 
government institutions which helped to influence the outcome of the various 
developments in this age of Venetian foreign affairs. In addition, this thesis 
will attempt to explain which factors were most important in determining the 
eventual success or failure of Venetian efforts to remain strong in the face of 
threats from many other powers, including most notably Genoa.
2The Initial Battles: Acre and Constantinople 
Although conditions which led to confrontation had been developing for 
centuries, early clashes between the two powers occurred during the 
mid- 1200s. In 1257 and 1258, a relatively minor incident escalated into the 
First Genoese War. At Acre, an argument broke out over the ownership of the 
church and outlying region near St. Saba, an area in which both powers 
maintained commercial trading posts/ In a heated argument between sailors 
of the two cities, a Venetian citizen murdered a Genoan. In response, the 
Gcnoans in the city raided the Venetian settlements, sacking and partially 
burning the area. The Venetians within the city feared extermination. As a 
result, the Venetians sent home urgent distress dispatches to the Republic.
When the Doge heard about the incident, he sent representatives to 
Genoa to ask for retribution. This ambassador was dismissed without any 
explanation for the Genoan actions or any promises to take actions to improve 
relations with Venice. In response to this reply, the Venetians quickly 
outfitted approximately fifteen galleys under the leadership of Lorenzo 
Tiepolo, ordering him to take decisive action against the Genoans in Acre/ 
This fleet, arriving in 1256, broke through a huge chain which the Genoans 
were using to barricade the harbor. Once inside, Tieoolo's men set fire to the 
Genoan ships, landed on the shores, and captured the town with little 
resistance. The Genoese asked for a truce, which Admiral Tiepolo granted.
During this cessation of hostilities, the Genoans prepared for a retaliatory 
attack. First, the government sent ships to the nearby port of Tyre. From this 
spot, the Genoan Admiral, Pietro Mallono, sailed back and forth across Acre,
3trying to draw the Venetians into an engagement. Instead of attacking 
prematurely, Tiepolo prepared his galleys and waited for an opportune time 
to engage Mollono. Finally, Tiepolo felt that conditions were advantageous, 
and he attacked the Genoans off the coast of Tyre. Despite the fact that there 
were only seventeen ships in the Venetian fleet, Tiepolo's forces trounced 
their enemy, capturing approximately twenty-five Genoese ships in the 
battle.^ This victory was very important for the Republic, as it severely 
undermined Genoa's maritime power in the Levant.
In response to this loss, Genoa again rearmed for battle. As would be 
proven time and time again throughout the years, a victory by one city only 
seemed to incite the other power to respond with renewed hatred and fervor. 
The Genoans built and manned four great ships and forty additional galleys. 
This fleet, put under the command of Rosso della Turca, soon set sail for 
Syria.** In August of 1258, this armada met Tiepolo's Venetian fleet, a clearly 
inferior force both in terms of type and number of ships. Despite this 
disadvantage, Tiepolo used his superior tactical skills to lead the Venetians to 
a complete victory. The Venetian fleet captured twenty-five galleys in the 
battle, and then took the ships back to Acre as war prizes. The Venetians 
then took additional actions against their enemy, pillaging and razing Genoan 
areas of the city. In this effort, the Venetians captured the two columns 
which now stand near the Porta della Carta, as well as the Pietra del Bando 
which sits at the southwest corner of St. Mark's cathedral.**
This struggle between the two great Italian cities threatened the 
collective strength of Christians in the Levant. This development was of
4importance to other Christian powers, who rightfully feared losing control of 
the rich area to the Muslims. As a result, Pope Alexander IV stepped in to 
mediate and forge an agreement between the two cities. The Pontiff used a 
variety of religious and political pressures to get the cities to agree to a truce, 
and believed that he had settled the problems in the Holy Land. 'I’his peace, 
however, was doomed from the beginning; the underlying causes of the 
animosity between the cities-commcrcial and maritime rivalries--creatcd 
inevitable friction and conflict.
The peace proved to be short-lived, and the rivals became embroiled in 
another clash only two years later in 1261. This conflict arose when 
developments in the East threatened the Venetian political and economic 
position in this region. At this time, an aspiring Greek by the name of 
Michael Paleologus decided to retake Constantinople and reestablish the 
Greek Empire. Because the Latin Empire had become progressively weaker 
since it was established in 1204, Paleologus reasoned that the powers of 
Western Europe would not act to save the doomed state if it was attacked 
This assumption, however, proved to be invalid. Much of the Venetian 
prosperity rested upon trade with the East. As a result, it was imperative for 
the Republic to have a ruler in Constantinople who was sympathetic to their 
interests. Venice therefore acted decisively when Paleologus threatened to 
gain control of Constantinople.
Despite their resolve, the Venetians had difficulty directing a response 
against the Greek invasion because the Venetians were taken by surprise. At 
the time of Paleologus's attack, much of the Republic's fleet was out at sea.
5Since they could not immediately engage the main body of the attacking 
forces, the Venetians tried to slow the Greek advance by hiring mercenary 
sailors and using reserve galleys to attack Greek forces at the city of 
Daphnusia in the Black Sca7
Unfortunately, however, this effort had little effect on the Greek forces. 
Led by General Strategopoulos, the invaders attacked Constantinople and took 
the ancient stronghold with little resistance. The conquerors then proceeded 
to set fire to the Venetian areas of the city, encouraging the Genoese in the 
area to pillage as many Venetian goods as possible. Officials in Venice of 
course sent troops to try to counterattack, but the Venetian forces arrived in 
the area too late to have any real effect. The only measure they could take 
when they sailed back through the Bosphorus was helping to rescue fellow 
Venetians who crowded on the shored
With the ascension of Paleologus, Venetian political and commercial 
strength in the Levant was weakened. The Republic had lost its position in a 
valuable trading port, and Genoa had benefited from Paleologus's victory. 
Earlier in the year, before the attack on Constantinople, Genoa and Paleologus 
had signed the Treaty of Ninfeo. Under the provisions of this agreement, 
Paleologus agreed to evict the Venetians from Constantinople if he conquered 
the city, and also agreed to grant the Genoans special trading privileges in 
Romania which previously had been given to the Venetians. The Genoans, in 
turn, had agreed to provide Paleologus with fleets which he could use at his 
own expense in his efforts against the Venetians. Although the Greeks did 
not need these ships in the conquest of Constantinople, the threat of these
6Genoese ships deterred the Republic from mounting an immediate military 
effort to recapture Constantinople.
Upon taking control of Constantinople, Paleologus had sweeping plans for 
his new empire. The Greek intended to remodel the Bzyantine Umpire, 
returning the state back to the condition which existed before the Fourth 
Crusade. As would be expected, however, the Venetians had no intention of 
letting the ruler realize his ambitions. In an effort to thwart Paleologus, the 
Republic sent representatives to the great powers of Europe, including the 
Vatican, Spain, and France. These emissaries were charged with the task of 
winning support for a plan to form a unified army made up of troops from 
across Western Europe. This force would reconquer Constantinople and 
reassert European influence in the Levant.
Despite the best efforts of the Venetian representatives, the European 
rulers did not respond positively to this plan. Although the various leaders 
welcomed the representatives and treated them well, the rulers did not offer 
any men or ships to help the Venetians. 'Phis response to the Venetian 
request is important, because it reflects a gradual shift in the focus of most 
European nations’ foreign policies. The fervor for the conquest of the Holy 
Lands, the militant spirit which fueled the Crusades, was clearly waning.
Instead of concentrating their resources in the Levant, most European 
countries wanted to focus on the growth of their own economies and relations 
with their immediate neighbors. If Venice wanted to maintain its prominent 
position in Constantinople, it would have to fight its battles alone. Control of 
the East meant far more to the Venetians than the other European powers.
7Therefore, other nations naturally were reluctant to commit resources to an 
area which they considered, in relative terms, of minor concern.
This lack of support from the other Kuropcan powers did not deter the 
Republic. Realizing that they would need to fight Palcologus and the Genoans 
on their own, the Venetians assembled another fleet of warships. This 
armada set sail in 1262 in search of the enemy. Despite Venetian efforts, 
during the period from 1262 to 1264, there was never a major confrontation 
between the two powers. The Venetians and Genoans often met in minor sea 
battles, but the two fleets never entered into a decisive engagement. The 
Genoans intermittently would capture a convoy of Venetian merchant galleys, 
and the Venetians would win some naval skirmishes, but neither side could
score a major victory.
V<^&tiim.WjMit^ Rest)Iting Peace
During 1264, however, fleets of the two cities met in a large-scale 
maritime engagement. In this year, in the Morea, Venetian galleys 
encountered a Genoese fleet of thirty-eight ships carrying goods to 
Monemvasia.^ In the battle which ensued at Settepozzi, the Venetians won 
a decisive victory, destroying the Genoese forces. In this clash, two of the 
Genoan Admirals lost their ships and the other two admirals refused to 
engage.
During 1265 and 1266, the Genoans avoided engaging the Venetians
8the area. In 1266, however, the Venetians once again confronted the 
Genoans. In this clash, the Venetians achieved another victory, conclusively 
winning the Battle of Trapani off the coast of Sicily. This defeat was not only 
a military setback for Genoa; the actions of the Genoan sailors in the conflict 
were a source of great embarrassment for the Italian city. When the 
Venetians attacked the Genoan fleet, its sailors panicked. Crews abandoned 
their ships and tried to swim to shore. Although the Genoans claimed that 
their sailors were not citizens but foreign mercenaries, they acknowledged 
the cowardice of their admiral in the defeat.
hollowing this Venetian victory, Emperor Paleologus decided it was in his 
best interests to restore alliances with the Republic. Although he certainly 
would have liked to see the two Italian powers continue to weaken each other 
in an extended maritime conflict, the Venetians clearly w'ere regaining their 
position of strength in the Levant. With the continued reappearance of 
Venetian influence, the Greek needed to avoid a conflict which could 
endanger the future of his empire. As a result, Paleologus extended an offer 
of mutual cooperation and allegiance to the Republic.
Venetian responses to the Emperor's offers of allegiance were mixed. 
Many citizens wanted to capitalize on the Iimpcror's deteriorating position 
and make a military attempt to reconquer Constantinople. Other Venetians, 
however, urged for diplomatic solutions. They argued that an offensive effort 
would be rather risky, and that the Republic would not receive any assistance 
in their efforts from the rest of Latin Europe. This group also cited the large 
expenses which would associated with maintaining control over the city of
9Constantinople. In addition, these Venetians pointed out that any military 
setback would encourage the Genoese to try to reassert themselves in the 
region. In the end, the group favoring diplomacy prevailed, and the 
Venetians signed a five year peace treaty with limperor Paleologus in 
1268. ' The Republic agreed to slop harassing the limperor, and in return, 
the Venetians were given special trading privileges and legal protections.
'I’his agreement obviously strengthened the Venetian commercial and political 
positions in Constantinople.
Developments hollowing Peace in Constantinople
Despite this treaty with the limperor, Venice maintained a hostile 
relationship with Genoa. Genoese merchants were enjoying great success, 
using the privileges given to them in Constantinople to compete with the once 
omnipotent Venetian traders. Although the Venetians had won back their 
commercial privileges, the Genoans had been granted similar favors. The 
Genoans were able to make substantial profits in Iiast/Wcst trade by utilizing 
their trading posts at Peru, settlements established near Constantinople with 
the approval of Paleologus. The Venetians were able to return to 
Contantinople in 1268, but the Republic never regained its uncontestcd 
position in Levantine trade. 'I his development was a source of resentment for 
Venice.
In addition, military struggles between the two Italian powers were 
hurting Venetian commerce. In an effort to protect her merchant ships, 
Venice required all of her trade to go in huge convoys. *2 Although this 
system allowed the Venetians to provide strong protection for commercial
goods in transit, the system presented some serious drawbacks, hirst, it was 
expensive to maintain the war galleys used as escort vehicles. In addition, 
the various types of ships in the convoys-gallcys, tarrettes, and 
lateeners-all moved at various rates of speed on the open sea. As a result, 
captains faced a great nautical challenge to keep the boats together during a 
voyage. Finally, the convoy system presented lucrative targets for Genoan 
raiders and other pirates. If an enemy force could draw the war ships away 
from the merchant vessels they were escorting, or if the attacking forces 
could defeat the escort ships, the raiders could inflict heavy losses and reap 
great material gains.
In contrast, the Germans typically sent their commercial boats out in 
small groups without any escort vessels. Although the Venetians were able to 
capture and defeat some of these Genoan merchant ships, most of the Genoan 
vessels were able to reach their destinations. Because the majority of 
Venetian war ships were being used as escort vessels, the Genoan ships did 
not need to worry about roving Venetian raiders. In addition, since the 
Genoans did not use military escorts, their galleys could harass Venetian 
shipping in quest of treasure.
As a result, in the late 1260s, the Venetians were eager to end their 
hostilities with Genoa and conclude a peace treaty. The Genoans were 
reluctant to come to terms because they were doing quite well raiding 
Venetian shipping, but outside events helped lead to an agreement. The King 
of France, Louis IX, was trying to persuade the European powers to 
reassemble a crusading force, and he wanted to have the disposal of both
Venetian and Genoan war ships to carry his forces. Mis pressure for a truce 
helped forge an agreement between the two Italian powers which was 
concluded in 1270.*^
This period of peace in Venetian foreign affairs led to a period of 
prosperity for the Republic. During the twenty year period before the Second 
Genoese War, the Venetians were able to avoid any major military 
entanglements. In contrast, Genoa and Pisa, another Italian maritime power, 
were busy harassing each other's shipping. As a neutral, Venice was able to 
carry goods across the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas without fear of 
attack. This neutrality allowed Venetian merchants to take advantage of the 
rapid growth of local economies both in Venice and in cities across Europe.
For example, Venice developed flourishing industries in area such as 
bell-casting, glass-working, wool production, and iron and porcelain 
manufacturing. These activities supplemented the city's traditional activities 
in salt and fish production. Likewise associated with the growth of the 
European economy was an increased growth in demand for goods from the 
Levant. During this period, Venice was able to expand her role in the trade 
with the East.
In addition, Venice was able to make increasingly large profits selling her 
own domestically produced goods. The Republic, of course, continued to make 
huge sums of money by transporting goods between the large cities of the 
Italian peninsula and the Levant, but Venice also was becoming a rival 
market to Constantinople. Local industries were able to supply the needs of 
cities like Alexandria, and Venice was serving as a clearing house for many
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raw materials of the Last such as cotton, wine, and hides. ^  finally, during 
this period Venetians were also able to take advantage of new trade routes 
across Mongol territory. These roads, some of which were ' discovered" by the 
famous Venetian merchant, Marco Polo, led through Persia, Mongolia, and 
even into China.
The Peace hauls; Renewed Fighting in the Second Genoese War
Despite the prosperity enjoyed during the time of peace, Venetian 
tensions with Genoa heightened again in the early 1290s. During this period, 
hostile advances by Muslim rulers such as the Soldan of Lgypt threatened 
Christian positions in the Levant. 'Phis situation was important to both Venice 
and Genoa because both cities needed safe trading bases in the Holy Land. 
From 1289 to 1291, the Soldan captured the cities of Acre, Tyre, and 
Tripoli.  ^ As a result, Lajazzo became the only mainland port in the Levant 
to remain under Christian control. In an effort to weaken the Muslims, the 
Pope strictly forbade any type of trade, contraband or otherwise, with the 
infidels. This prohibition did not stop trade with the Soldan because some 
merchants naturally were willing to service the needs of the Muslims for a 
price; however, the conquest of the former Christian ports did lead Genoa and 
Venice into another military conflict.
The two powers moved towards war throughout the years following the 
fall of Jerusalem. Despite the existence of a truce, the two cities engaged in 
intermittent but repeated attacks on each other's shipping. These clashes 
naturally kept Venice and Genoa at odds. The powers were again op a 
collision course, as the cities had similar goals that drew them into clashes
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with each other, Each maritime power wanted to dominate trade with the 
East, and this objective required undisputed control of the Black Sea. Gaining 
control of this body of water would be impossible without engaging the other 
city in large scale battle.
This struggle for control of the Black Sea led to a scries of skirmishes 
which escalated into full-scale war. During 1294, there was a minor 
confrontation which resulted in the plundering of several Venetian galleys.'” 
In response, the Venetians assembled a great escort for their convoy destined 
for Armenia and Cyprus, intending to defeat thoroughly any aggressor which 
would move against the vessels. This convoy set sail on their journey, 
stopping at Cyprus to overrun or raze Genoese areas of the island.
After the Venetians continued on their journey, the Genoese survivors 
sent word of their distress to their nation's settlement at Pera, a suburb near 
Constantinople. In response to the news of the attack, the Gcnoans assembled 
ships and men both from Pera and throughout Romania. 'Phis force set sail in 
an effort to take revenge, and encountered the Venetian fleet off the coast of 
Lajazzo. Upon finding the Venetian vessels, the Genoans immediately 
attacked. In this confrontation, the Venetians were taken by surprise. They 
outnumbered the Genoans, and as a result did not bother to lower their sails, 
an action which would have made their boats easier to handle during a battle. 
Loaded down with full cargoes of merchandise, and hampered by their 
upraised sails, the Venetian ships were very unwieldy. The Genoans took full 
advantage of this superior maneuverability and routed the Venetian convoy.
In this engagement, the Genoans captured many ships and took rich spoils
from the Venetian cargoes.
Fueled by their initial success, the Genoans were eager to continue on the 
offensive. They assembled a fleet of unprecedented size, a force comprised of 
some 150 galleys and approximately 35,000 sailors.*' The Venetians 
assembled a somewhat smaller licet, and were wary about engaging the huge 
enemy armada. Although the Genoans did their best to force a battle, sailing 
to Messina off the northern coast of Sicily, the Venetians were able avoid a 
confrontation. Disappointed, the Genoese fleet returned home and did not set 
sail during all of 1296 because of internal political squabbling. During this 
year, the Venetians sent galleys which acted as raiders and pirates 
throughout the Levant. These raiding campaigns captured some valuable 
plunder, much like previous Genoan operations during the 1260s. Venetian 
small-scale raiding continued for three years until Genoa was able to force its 
enemy into a major naval battle.
A Great Clash Off ( 'ui /<_>la
This confrontation occurred during 12(>8 a fen a huge Genoan fleet 
which had been plundering the coast of Dalmatia met up with an even larger 
Venetian force. This Genoese fleet It.id been e\a dug heavy damages along 
the coast, and the Venetians needed to attempt to halt the destruction. The
two navies clashed near the island of ( w /->la in the mid-Adriatic. Iliis battle 
was the largest of its time between the iw< cities, with approximately ninety 
Venetian and eighty Genoan boats involve I in the struggle. In this 
engagement, both sides suffered great losses of men and ships, but he 
Genoese clearly scored a victoiy. Thousands of Venetian sailors were taken
prisoner and dozens of' galleys were captured.
Despite this triumph, however, the Genoans were not able to seriously 
threaten the Republic. The Genoan fleet was in no position to push on in a 
continued offensive effort after its victory, and Venice quickly was able to 
reassemble its military fleets in its famed shipbuilding facilities. During early 
1299, some adventurous Venetian raiders, led by their commander, Domenico 
Schiavo, even made a sneak hit-and-run attack on the city of Genoa. This 
attack was motivated by Venice's desire to prove that the city had not been 
crushed by the defeat.
Realizing the inability of cither side to push the war to a decisive 
conclusion, the Genoans and Venetians ended their hostilities. Both cities 
were being drained by the military rivalry, as the struggle was costly both in 
terms of financial and human resources. Genoa also was suffering from 
internal political rivalries, a further reason to push the city towards peace. 
During late 1299. the two cities declared a truce. In the treaty which was 
signed, the powers essentially agreed to observe respective spheres of 
influence. Venice accepted Genoan domination of the Italian Riviera, and 
Genoa in turn recognized Venetian supremacy within the Adriatic.
Specifically, the Genoans agreed that none of their ships would enter the 
Adriatic during a period of military hostilities unless the vessel was bound for 
Venice. The Republic also abandoned its support of Guelfs located in Monaco, 
a political group which aided the Pope against the German emperors and also 
threatened the rulers of Genoa. This treaty, signed on May 2 5 ,1299, was 
ii’iendc 1 to insure a perpetual peace between the two longtime enemies.*^
16
Peace With Genoa. Bill Clashes Elsewhere 
Venice’s peace with Genoa, however, did not keep the Republic from 
becoming embroiled in other conflicts. While Genoa was always a principal 
item of concern in Venetian foreign relations, the Republic had wide-ranging 
interests which often caused tensions with other powers. Like the struggles 
with Genoa, these hostilities typically were the result of economic and 
political rivalries either on land or at sea.
During 1308, for example, the Republic became involved in a dispute 
with Pope Clement V over control of the city of Ferrara. 'Phis crisis was 
precipitated by the death of the ruler of Ferrara, the Marquis Azzo VII. The 
Marquis was a member of house of Fste, a family that had been one of the 
most powerful and influential groups in Northern Italy during the preceding 
centuries.^ The house of Este had been in control of Modena, Padua, Verona, 
and Mantua at one time or another, and also was responsible for defending 
Ferrara from the Ghibcllinc captain, Salingucrra Torelli, during the early 
1200s.™ As a result, when Venice captured both the city and Torelli during 
1240, the Este family became the rulers of the Ferrara. During their 
sixty-two year reign, they governed as puppets of the Venetian government.
In this period, they angered several Popes by resisting strong pro-Guelf 
pressure in regards to political issues in Northern Italy.
At Azzo’s death, there was no conclusive heir to his throne. He had not 
fathered any legitimate children, and had produced one illegitimate son,
Fosco, who in turn had a son named Folco “ 1 Although Azzo had two 
brothers, he selected his grandson Folco as his successor. Upon Azzo’s death,
his two brothers immediately contested his will, claiming that they should 
become rulers of Ferrara. Folco, in turn, appealed to Venice to intercede to 
protect his son's inheritance. In response to Foleo's plea, the Venetians sent a 
military detachment to Ferrara.
This action was met with a strong response from Pope (dement V, who 
had been located in Avignon since 1307. Clement wanted to prevent Venice 
from taking direct control the city, so lie acted upon a papal claim to 
suzerainty within the city. Based on this right, he declared the two brothers 
as the legitimate heirs of Azzo. Fosco became frightened when he heard of 
the Pope's decision. As the illegitimate son of the deceased Marquis, his base 
of power was rather tenuous. He did not want to challenge the Pontiff, so he 
turned over the city to the Republic, led the Venetian troops to a stronghold 
in Castel Tedaldo, and fled to Venice. Clement, standing firm, dispatched 
Papal troops under the control of the legate Cardinal Pelagrua.
The Papal troops entered Ferrara, and the Cardinal sent a message to 
Doge Gradenigo demanding that the Venetian forces withdraw. Gradenigo 
refused. With the Republic's troops holding the Castel Tedaldo, Venice was in 
a strong position to dictate the course of events, and the city did not want to 
give in to Papal threats. In response to the Venetian refusal, the Pope 
suggested a compromise. This proposal offered the Venetians control of the 
city, but they would rule Ferrara as a papal fief, paying an annual rent of 
20,000 ducats to the Pontiff.^ 'Phis offer was summarily rejected by the 
Republic. They told the Cardinal that they had taken control of the city at the 
request of the rightful heir of the deceased Marquis. As such, they would not
rule as representatives of’ the Pope or pay any rent to Clement.
The Papal forces werp determined to keep Venice from maintaining 
undisputed control of Ferrara. The Cardinal sent an ultimatum to the 
Venetians in October of 1308, giving the troops ten days to agree to his 
demands.23 if the Venetians refused to accept the conditions of his proposal, 
the Republic and its rulers would be placed under interdict and would be 
excommunicated. In addition, all Venetian goods and property would be 
confiscated, all commercial privileges would be revoked, and all trade and 
commerce would be suspended. Finally, the Po River would be blockaded to 
Venetian and Chioggian ships.
This action was a substantial threat to both the political and economic 
strength of Venice. Realizing the gravity of the decision which now faced the 
Republic, the Great Council assembled. During debate on the issue, the le iders 
of the Republic were divided along fairly clear lines. The case vecchie, or 
more established families, generally argued that Venice should accede to the 
Pope’s demands. This group reasoned that the Republic had not yet 
recovered from its extended period of war with Genoa, and that the city did 
not need to risk a potentially costly and risky engagement. In addition, these 
leaders argued that the Republic should not incur the wrath of the Pope, God's 
temporal representative.
The newer members of the assembly, led by Doge Gradenigo, wished to 
challenge the Pontiff. This group asserted that the political welfare of the 
Republic required Venice to extend its authority into Ferrara. These 
individuals stated that the Pope had no right to try to dispute Venice's
rightful claims, and suggested that Clement might have been misinformed by 
messengers who could have misrepresented the situation to him. These men 
argued that Venice could not pass up an opportunity to enhance its economic 
and political influence by backing down to a Pope who was at best 
misinformed, or at worst unjustified.
This dispute had divisive consequences Doth inside and outside of the 
Great Council. The Guelfish faction, led by the the Uuerini and the Tiepolo
families, squared off against the pro-expansion forces led by the Gradenigo 
and Dandolo families. Not only was there acrimonious debate in the 
Assembly, there were also riots and fights in the streets, and many citizens 
traveled armed through the city. After much conflict, the pro-expansion 
forces prevailed. Hie Republic appointed a podesta' to govern Ferrara, and 
the residents of Ferrara were given full Venetian citizenship rights.24 
Although this action defied the threats of the Cardinal and Pope, the powers 
in Avignon took no immediate action against the Venetians. Winter had set 
in, making communication and military efforts difficult, so Pope Clement 
decided to wait before ordering an attack.
In an attempt to settle the confrontation diplomatically, the Venetians 
sent envoys to the Pope during March of 1309. Unfortunately, these 
ambassadors never had any effect on Papal opinions or actions. The day after 
the representatives left for Avignon, March 27, 1309, the Pope 
excommunicated the entire Republic. In his excommunication proclamation, 
the Pope imposed terms which were even more severe than his threatened 
actions of the previous year. In addition to all of the previous penalties, the
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Pope declared that all Venetian citizens were outside of the law. As such, 
Venetians could be imprisoned or enslaved without any fear of incurring the 
wrath of God. Venetian citizens were not expected to remain loyal to their 
leaders or doge, and all clergy were ordered to leave the Republic within 
forty days.
Despite the harsh terms of this excommunication, neither Doge Gradcnigo 
nor the Republic retreated from their positions. The Venetians knew that the 
Pope would call on the various Christian nations to attack Venetian 
possessions, and the Republic prepared to defend its interests. Acting upon 
the call of the Pontiff, powers from across Europe and Asia assaulted Venetian 
territories in April of 1309, Venetian citizens were attacked both on land and 
on the sea. The only destination to which ships could sail without fear of 
attack was Egypt, home of the Soldan,
AJ&MlbiflMAtM
In Ferrara, Venetian troops under the direction of the podesta prepared 
to face the assembling armies of Christiandom. The Venetians strengthened 
their stronghold at the Castel Tedaldo and prepared for battle. Their enemy 
was assembling under the call of the Cardinal for a crusade against Venice 
and its possessions. In response to this request, armies from Florence, 
Ancona, Lucca, and towns throughout Tuscany, Lombardy, and Romagna 
gathered during the early summer of 1309.^ The cities which sent forces 
were motivated by several factors-a desire to weaken Venice’s political and 
military influence, a desire to plunder the treasures of the Republic, and a 
desire to remain under the blessing of the Pontiff.
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These forces arrived at Ferrara and besieged the city. This attack proved 
to be effective against the Venetians. From the onset of the engagement, the 
forces of the Republic suffered a series of setbacks. The troops were struck 
with an outbreak of bubonic plague which killed many of the men, including 
the podesta*. Although reinforcements were sent, the epidemic severely 
weakened the Venetian forces. In August, the Papal forces recaptured 
Ferrara.^ The Republic's soldiers were routed, and the vast majority of men 
either were killed or blinded. Doge Gradenigo was one of the few Venetians 
who escaped unharmed, but rumors abounded that he had deserted the 
forces of the Republic in an act of cowardice.
Despite this crushing loss, however, the Venetians refused to surrender. 
The intensity of the battle even subsided because the Pope did not want to 
push the offensive after becoming embroiled in a series of arguments with 
Francesco d' liste, one of the brothers of the deceased Marquis.
Venice, too, was occupied with others concerns. By the onset of 1310, the 
papal restrictions on commerce were beginning to seriously affect Venetian 
trade revenues. This loss of earnings was having a dramatic effect on the 
welfare of the merchants and people of the Republic. This problem, combined 
with unrest in the wake of the military defeat at Ferrara, made Doge 
Gradenigo's position very precarious. His enemies and opponents in the Great 
Council were accusing him of betraying the Republic, and asserted that the 
candidate Gradenigo had defeated, Giacomo Tiepolo, never would have led 
Venice to such harm. Conflict within the Council heated up, and 
demonstrations and street fights became commonplace. Gradenigo tried to
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calm the situation, but eventually had to resort to ruthless suppressions of 
any affronts to his leadership. These actions further exacerbated tensions.
The Revolutionary Attack on the State
Eventually, this situation culminated in an uprising on June 15, 1310, led 
by the infamous Bajamontc Tiepolo. Enemies of the Republic prepared to 
stage a coup d' clot and topple the elected government of the Republic. In 
the plan for this military effort, the revolutionary forces were to divide into 
three groups. Under the leadership of Tiepolo and Marco Querini, the first 
two of these sections were to gather on the evening of June 14 at the Querini 
house. At dawn, these forces were to cross the Rialto, separate, and march on 
different routes to the Ducal Palace. A third group, led by Badocr Badoer, was 
to lay in wait at the small mainland community at Peraga. When the ducal 
forces and first two groups of revolutionaries were engaged in battle, Badocr's 
men were to surprise the Doge's men from behind and defeat them.
This plan did not work at all. It is possible that the revolutionaries were 
betrayed by a nobleman who had abandoned the insurrectionary effort after 
much planning had been com pleted/? Regardless, Doge Gradcnigo knew of 
the plan during the week prior to the actual attack on his government. During 
this time, the Doge assembled many supporters both from within Venice and 
from neighboring towns and prepared a plan to thwart the attempted coup d’ 
etat. On the evening of June 14, the Doge assembled a sizeable force within 
the Ducal Palace and gathered another group of armed supporters on the 
Piazza. On this night, Venice was struck with raging storms. Because of the 
tremendous amount of rain and high winds, Badoer was not able to cross to
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the mainland; however, Tiepolo never knew of his failure. Ignorant both of 
Badoer's location and the fact that the Doge was aware of his plans, Tiepolo 
ordered the attack on the Palace to proceed despite the rains.
In this engagement, both Tiepolo’s and Querini's groups of revolutionaries 
were crushed. Querini's men advanced through the streets as planned, but 
when they arrived at the Piazza across from the Ponte dei Dai, they were met 
by the waiting forces of the Doge. Most of the revolutionaries, including the 
two members of the Querini family, were killed. Likewise, Tiepolo's rebels 
also met with complete defeat. As his men advanced on the Palace, the 
residents of Venice rallied behind their Doge. In an event which has become 
ingrained in the folklore of the city, a elderly woman named Giustina Rossi 
who lived in the area helped to turn back the attack. When Tiepolo's troops 
advanced towards the entrance of the Piazza, this woman threw a heavy 
flowerpot, or by some accounts, a large stone mortar, at Bajamonte. Although 
she missed him, the object struck and killed Tiepolo's flag-bearer. Realizing 
that the residents of Venice opposed his efforts, and shaken by the sight of 
his standard bearer killed in front of him, Bajamonte Tiepolo led his troops in 
retreat back across the Rialto. As they crossed, they destroyed the bridge to 
try to foster the success of the escape. Meanwhile, Badoer and his men soon 
were captured and beheaded.
Tiepolo, however, escaped death. He fled with his men to another section 
of the city where he was soon joined by the few survivors of Querini's band of 
rebels. In the area of Venice beyond the Rialto, the rebels enjoyed strong 
popular support, and they began to fortify their position. Doge Gradcnigo,
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hesitant to engage in a battle that might escalate into a full-scale civil war, 
offered lenient terms to the rebel commander if he would surrender, Tiepolo 
accepted this offer, ending the armed challenge to Gradenigo's rule. Under 
the terms of this agreement, Bajamonte was banished to Dalmatia for a 
four-year term of exile. As soon as Tiepolo departed, his home in S. Stin was 
razed, and the "Column of Infamy" was erected on the location. This column 
was a monument designed to serve as a constant reminder of the futility of 
trying to start a revolution against the rightful rulers of the Republic.
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As can be imagined, this event was a serious threat to the future and 
stability of the city. Faced with military, economic, and political threats 
abroad, suffering under papal excommunication and interdict, and 
endangered by armed revolution at the gates of the Ducal Palace, the Republic 
was clearly at a crossroads. In an effort to prevent this type of event from 
occurring again, the Great Council established the Council of Ten on July 10, 
1310.28
Although this group was responsible for preventing subversion by 
gathering information on the activities of possible enemies of the Republic 
within the city, the Council also soon began to play a role in foreign affairs. 
This Council was subjected to several checks and balances designed to 
prevent it from abusing its wide-ranging powers, but also had great power 
which it could use to quickly respond to an internal or external threat to the 
Republic. As such, the Council did the Republic a great service because it 
allowed the government to react quickly and reach decisions on matters of
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uroat urgency. Previously, any matter of major importance had to be debated 
and voted upon by the Great Council, a body which numbered approximately 
1,100 members at the time of Tiepolo's rebel lion.^ When reacting to foreign 
policy issues in which a quick response was necessary, this decision-making 
process clearly was unacceptable. The Council of Ten was invaluable in this 
situation because it could, when making policy with Doge and his Ducal 
councillors, act with the authority of the entire Great Council. This flexibility 
was a great asset to the Republic in future years.
Meanwhile, the conflict with the Pope over Perrara still persisted. T his 
confrontation precipitated the Papal Interdict of 1310, a measure which 
served to undermine the economic vitality of the Republic. During 1311, in 
the midst of the political and economic clash, Doge Gradenigo died. 'Phis 
problem of the Interdict was thus passed to the Doge's successor, Marino 
Zorzi, causing him a great deal of consternation. Zorzi too died, however, after 
only three months, and the problem was passed to the next Doge, Giovanni 
Soranzo. This new leader set forth to make peace with the Pontiff in order to 
help reopen Venetian trading contacts.
AoJE.ndLlP-.T hfe£lash at Ferrara. An Uprising al ZarikJind NewX'ojTiinerdiil
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Doge Soranzo was able to get the Pope to lift the interdict in 1312 by 
resorting to a rather irreverent solution-lie offered tu pay the Pope a 
100,000 ducat indem nity.A lthough this was a tremendous expenditure for 
a state which had already borne the cost of many years of foreign wars, the 
funds proved to be money well spent. Pope Clement V lifted his Interdict in
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March of 1313, repealing his restrictions on Venetian commercial activities. 
These actions were of supreme importance to Venice because the city could 
resume the trading and economic activities which made her so powerful. By 
ending the clash with the Pope, Doge Soranzo did his nation a great service.
Later in 1312, the Doge achieved his second major foreign-policy 
triumph. During the Republic's years of problems with Ferrara, the Pope, and 
Bajamonte Tiepolo, the nearby town of Zara broke out in rebellion and threw 
off Venetian domination. After Venice regained internal stability following 
the defeat of Tiepolo, Soranzo brought Zara under Venetian control once again. 
This action helped to stabilize the internal conditions within the Republic.
Following the suppression of Zara, Venice entered upon a period of 
growth and prosperity. Her treasuries were not being drained by costly 
foreign wars, and her merchants could conduct business with traders across 
Christiandom and beyond. During the years following the defeat of Tiepolo, 
the city signed diplomatic and commercial treaties with several powers across 
Hu rope and Asia: Sicily, Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Persia, Tunisia, Trcbizond, and 
the Bzyantine Empire.-  ^^  This reassertion of economic influence coincided 
with a decline in Genon power as Venice's rival had become bogged down in a 
series of problems at her colony of Pcra. In addition, Genoa also had been 
involved in a prolonged struggle with Morocco over control of Eastern access 
to the Mediterranean. In a confrontation between these powers in 1291, the 
Genoese dealt a crushing blow to the Moroccan fleet, effectively ending the 
Moroccan plans of closing the straits of Gibraltar. This action ironically had 
positive effects for the Republic. With open access tc ic Atlantic, Venetian
fleets began to expand their trade with flotii hing markets in Great Britain 
and Handers.
The continual expansion of foreign commercial activity and growth of the 
scope of Venetian foreign affairs led the city to undertake several new 
maritime projects. In the later part of the tlmtcenth century, for example, 
developments in nautical technology were introduced that had a great effect 
on the historical strengths of the city: shipbuilding and trading. With < 
introduction of the mariner's compass in the 127()s or 80s, cartographers and 
navigators were able to create much more accurate maps and charts of the 
seas. These new resources made sea travel safer and more reliable. In 
addition, shipwrights also developed the rudder during the last quarter of the 
thirteenth century. Previously, ships had to be steered with oars which were 
extended into the water from the sides of the vessels. As can be imagined, 
this method of navigating put severe limits on the size of ships. A large boat 
would simply be uncontrollable when loaded with a heavy cargo and when 
sailing on the open seas. With the introduction of the stern post rudder, 
vessels began to grow larger.
Ironically, the rudder also contributed to a decline in the socio-economic 
status of seamen within Venetian society. The days of merchant-oarsmen, 
accompanying their goods to faraway ports, rapidly were becoming a thing of 
the past. The most talented citizens of the Republic were becoming 
merchants who traded their goods through agents set up in foreign markets,
The crews of the city were still of superior talent, but the ^allcotti 
increasingly became men who had been born outside of the city. These
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sailors were not being employed as handlers of sails or as tillers, but instead 
were being utilized as mere rowers, During this period, jobs on ships became 
more  ^ ialized, with an increasing division of labor. Previously, gallcoHi 
had sailed, traded, and fought as the principal weapons of the Venetian ships. 
Now, navigational duties were performed by men skilled in reading charts 
and maps, defensive efforts were handled by bowmen, and professional 
merchants controlled most commercial activities. As a result, many sailors on 
the great galleys were employed only as rowers. This job soon became a 
position which was regarded as an inferior means of earning one's livelihood.
The general growth of foreign economic activity, and the tremendous 
amount of new trading with Hnglish and Flemish ports, precipitated the 
development of a new type of ocean vessel in the first quarter of the 
fourteenth century .^2 The increased volume of trade, combined with the 
introduction of the rudder and mariner's compass, created a demand for a 
new type of high-speed, large merchant vessel. This demand was filled by 
the merchant galley, a boat which had a tremendous influence on Venetian 
foreign commercial activity in the decades and centuries following its 
introduction.
These boats were somewhat similar to the traditional Venetian war 
galleys in that they were powered by sail as well as by a large crew of 
oarsmen. The merchant galleys, however, were longer and wider than their 
military predecessors, able to cany approximately ISO tons of cargo. These 
boats also carried approximately 50 tons of supplies which were used and 
traded by crewmen of the vessel. ^
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Although the ship carried approximately two hundred oarsmen, these 
individuals principally were not used to increase the speed of the ships.
When on the open seas, merchant galleys took advantage of their long, 
narrow shape to sail at rapid rates. Oarsmen on these ships were not needed 
for speed, but instead filled two important functions-dncreasing 
maneuverability and providing defensive power against raiders. The 
oarsmen allowed the boats to quickly and safely maneuver through harbors, 
and also gave the captain an auxiliary source of power when winds were low 
or when the ship was tacking into the wind. The oarsmen were of great value 
against pirates because the ships' speed, combined with a ready force of 200 
soldiers, made them elusive and formidable opponents.
These merchant galleys were expensive to operate, especially since all 
200 oarsmen were free men, but the advantages of the new ship justified the 
increased expenditures. A journey could be completed in a fraction of the 
time of previous trips, and the boats were virtually unassailable to roving 
pirates. The maneuverability of the galleys also aided in avoiding rocks or 
similar dangers in the water.
All of these advances in shipbuilding and the resulting upsurge in foreign 
trade led the Venetians to expand their Arsenal during the period around 
1320. This facility produced increasing numbers of ships which the 
Venetians organized into convoys. These vessels were owned by the state and 
led by patroni, men who had won public auctions for control of the ships. 
After being approved by the Senate, these patroni then hired crewman for 
the ships. In addition, these men also organized the efforts to apportion
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cargo space to Venetians who wanted to trade with foreign merchants.
These individuals, however, were not the ultimate powers in the 
merchant fleets. The leader of the entire convoy was the capitanio, a 
government employee. These capitani were responsible to the various 
councils of the Republic and to the Doge himself. They were in charge of 
assuring that all merchants paid their freights duties, and that no people or 
extra wares were snuck into the hold. In addition, the capitani led and 
coordinated all defensive actions which might be necessary to ward off 
raiders and pirates. The times and routes of the convoys, as well as the rates 
which were charged for carrying cargo, however, were set by a vote of the 
Senate.
Venetian galleys were organized into fleets which roamed across the seas 
to ports throughout Europe and the Hast. Venetian strength was always 
largely an outgrowth of the great commercial power of the city, and in the 
early part of the fourteenth century the Republic enjoyed the fruits of 
flourishing trading activity. During the 1320s and 1330s, the Senate sent 
eight to ten ships each year into the Black Sea.*^ Venetian ships also 
traveled to 1 ana in the Sea of Azov, an important site because of its 
placement on the route to Persia and China. In addition, Tana was the home 
to especially large slave markets, sources of slave labor desired on the Italian 
Peninsula, in Crete and Cyprus, and in Egypt. Government-owned fleets also 
journeyed to Romania, the ports of Beyond-the-Sea, Cyprus, and Syria.
Other big trade stops were Alexandria and various other Mediterranean 
ports which gave the Venetians access to markets in the Muslim-controlled
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lands of F.gypt. Although the Pope had at various times forbidden trade with 
the infidels, and although a papal decree kept Venetian ships from journeying 
to Alexandria during the period from 1322 to 1344, merchants of the 
Republic easily found ways to service Muslim demand for wares. Ships 
docked at Christian territory in Armenia at the port of Lajazzo, and also at 
ports in Tunis and Cyprus.^ Throughout the period of the official papal ban 
on trade with F.gypt, Venetian merchants still were able to trade cotton, 
drugs, and spices which were cither produced or carried through Muslim 
lands.
The Close of Peace: Struggles in Treviso 
Venice's period of peace which started after the cessation of the 
hostilities at Ferrara eventually came to an end. During the early fourteenth 
century, the other cities of the Italian mainland increasingly were becoming 
dominated by despotic rulers. One of these tyrants was Can Grande della 
vScala, the young ruler of his native city of Verona, as well as Vicenza, Parma, 
Brescia, Belluno, Feltre, and Padua.-™ In July of 1329, della Scala led the 
Veronese armies in a successful campaign against Treviso. This acquisition 
made Venice vulnerable to the threat of economic blockade. This action, 
therefore, was of great interest to the Venetian rulers. Although Can Grande 
fell to a sudden illness shortly after capturing Treviso, the despot was 
succeeded by his equally ambitious nephew, Mastino. Under Mastino’s 
direction, Verona imposed harsh restrictions against Venetian commercial 
activity. Duties were placed on Venetian goods, and chains were set up across 
the Po River to block Venetian trade with Lombardy.^
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Venice took all possible retributive actions against these measures. The 
Republic imposed costly tariffs on all goods which passed through the lagoons 
on route to cities controlled by Mastino. These duties effectively deprived the 
cities of Padua and Treviso of spices and luxury items from the Orient and 
Near Last. Despite these actions, however, the Venetians were powerless to 
strike any real crippling blow against their enemy. Venice was not 
threatened on a short-term basis, but the Veronese restrictions put the 
Republic in long-term peril as it cut off supply lines for vital products such as 
grain, meat, and wood.
Under these conditions, Venice clearly would come to a point of crisis 
with Verona in the next several years. Direct diplomacy with the foreign city 
did not seem to be a viable option, despite the Republic’s famed abilities in 
statesmanship, because Venice had little leverage with which to bargain, As a 
result, the city eventually responded to the Veronese threat with military 
actions. This decision was taken with great trepidation. Venice remembered 
her defeat at Ferrara, and knew that her small land-based forces would be 
fighting an uphill battle against the potent armies of Verona.
Despite these difficulties, Venice utilized its diplomatic skills to assemble 
a coalition against Mastino’s armies. The tyrant's success in gaining control of 
mainland cities such as Brescia, Lucca, and Parma throughout the 1330s had 
made him a feared rival for other powerful cities on the Peninsula. Likewise, 
Mastino's failed attempts at acquiring states such as Mantua, as well as his 
unsuccessful attempt to poison Azzo Visconti of Milan, had raised additional 
emotions in favor of his defeat. Venice assembled a joint force of men from
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the Republic, in addition to nmercenaries and free men from across Italy, 
France, and Germany. This force numbered approximately 30,000 men, and 
met at the city of Ravenna to begin its campaign against Mastino.*^
This army was led by Pietro de' Rossi, an extremely capable and 
respected general of his day. Under Rossi's leadership, the combined 
Venetian forces began a successful campaign against the Veronese leader in 
October of 1336. The Venetian forces quickly broke into Paduan territory, 
and in November won a victory at the fortress outside the great Paduan 
saltworks. After this battle, Rossi proceeded to take Treviso. With the 
Venetian forces displaying their skill and promising future successes, other 
cities within Italy were persuaded to join the campaign. In March of 1337, 
the cities of Ferrara, Mantua, and Milan joined the coalition.
The armies of the combined Italian cities pressed on in their efforts to 
destroy Mastino. They advanced on the despot from several fronts, and 
Mastino realized that his position was doomed. In an effort to avoid complete 
ruin, the tyrant sent Marseglio di Carrara to Venice as a diplomatic 
representative. Carrara was ruling Padua at this time as a puppet of Mastino, 
but before the fall of the city, Carrara had been the true ruler of the city of 
.Padua.
When the emissary met with the Doge in Venice, he offered to betray the 
Veronan in return for the lordship of his former city. The Doge, Francesco 
Dandolo, accepted this offer. The Venetians launched a phantom attack on the 
town of Brescia, drawing Mastino away his efforts to defend Padua. Upon 
Mastino's departure, Carrara opened the gate to Padua and welcomed in Rossi
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and his Venetian armies. The city became free of Mastino's control on August 
3, 1338, and the Veronese despot was doomed. He continued his fight for 
several more months, but quickly realized that defeat was inevitable.
On January 24, 1339, Mastino ended his fight and agreed to a Venetian 
peace o f f e r . I ' l l  is pact allowed the Scaligeri family to keep the town of 
Lucca, only ceding the city’s hinterlands and outlying fortresses to Florence.
In addition, Florence received a tribute payment in return for allowing 
Verona to retain Parma. For her own efforts, Venice received the town of 
Padua, as well as Treviso and its outlying areas. The Republic turned Padua 
over to its allies in the Carrara family, and also gave the Carraras some of the 
outlying towns near Treviso. Venice kept Treviso, Conegliano, Castelfranco, 
Sacile, and Oderzo. This area was placed under direct Venetian control.
This peace treaty marked a critical turning point in the history of 
Venetian foreign affairs. The territory gained in this agreement was the first 
territory on the mainland ever acquired by the Republic, in taking control of 
a prosperous and important area of the Italian Peninsula, Venice began a 
trend towards greater involvement in mainland affairs. By gaining 'Proviso 
and many of its surrounding towns, Venice was able to eliminate the danger 
of an economic blockade along the Po. The Republic also acquired a 
productive region which could provide grains and meats, foodstuffs which the 
city could not produce on its own.
'Phe people of Venice were very pleased with the results of this military 
engagement against Mastino. They had crushed a rival who was undermining 
their economic prosperity, and also gained prestige and valuable products
through newly annexed territories, hollowing the signing of the peace treaty, 
several families which had fought with Venice, the Carraras, the Gonzagas, 
and the Estes, were asked to join the Venetian nobility.^* In upcoming years, 
Venice would increasingly be drawn to activity on the terra firma , despite its
links with the sea.
This settlement did have its drawbacks, even if the disadvantages were 
not immediately seen by the exuberant Venetians. The Republic had 
acquired a large and critical area of the terra J’irma, but it would need to 
defend this land from its rivals. The rulers in Goriziu and Aquileia weic 
longtime problems for the Venetians, and they would certainly be eager to 
take over Venice's new acquisitions at the first possible chance. In additioi 
the city of Milan also emerged from this engagement in a strong military anu 
political position. In winning the struggle, Venice had eliminated one threat, 
but had helped to create another. Since the Visconti's territories bordered on 
Venice’s puppet state at Padua, there was plenty of opportunity for Milan and 
Venice to clash in the future. Despite these problems though, the Republic 
was happy with the agreement. Peace had been won, and Venetian influence 
now extended onto the mainland.
A Prudent Method of Administration
Venice established a system of government in her possessions that was 
relatively analogous to her own political structure. Each city had a chief 
official called a podesta' , a man who could either be from Venice or could also 
be a resident of the town in question. This podesta' was elected by an 
assembly of nobles from the respective towns through a complicated process
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similar to the election of the Doge. This assembly was responsible for 
enacting basic administrative legislation and performing duties such as 
assessing local taxes, and providing civic services and ceremonies for the 
people.
Behind the podesta' and the council, however, stood the real power in 
the government stru. lure. Within this system, all issues of major importance 
were handled by an individual called a Rector. This Rector had to be a citizen 
of Venice, and he was a trusted arm of the Doge and Senate. The Rector 
communicated with the home city about all matters of consequence, and 
carried out the orders of the Republic. The Rector was able to control the 
decision-making power because he was in charge of the town police, as well 
as any military personnel in the area. In reality, the Rector could make the 
final decision on any civil or military decision in his town or city.
The Venetians found this system to be effective, and used the format in 
later years in other mainland acquisitions. The structure was good because it 
allowed the Republic to keep strong control over matters of critical 
importance within its possessions. In addition, residents in the towns 
typically were satisfied. The Rectors and podesta' usually were very 
respectful of the rights of local individuals, and emphasized that the smaller 
towns and Venice could cooperate economically to the advantage of both 
parties. The Republic did not levy high duties on the products of the 
mainland towns, and also did not garrison large contingents of soldiers who 
would need to be supported by local inhabitants. The Venetians, of course, 
were not perfect, but they typically showed restraint and fairness in dealing
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with their lands on the terra finna.
Another important event in Venetian foreign affairs occurred in 1340, 
although this development took place far away from the Italian Peninsula. In 
this year, the new Doge, Andrea Dandolo, received an appeal from Edward III 
of England. The British monarch wanted to hire forty Venetian war galleys to 
employ in his fight against King Philip of l;rancc. In return, he offered to pay 
for the vessels, and, as an inducement, also granted Venetian citizens the full 
rights and privileges of Englishmen within the British Kingdom. The Senate 
thanked Hdward for the grant of the new rights, but would not lease any 
warships to the Englishman. This decision was motivated by the fact that the 
Venetians were concerned about a Turkish fleet of 225 ships which was 
lurking in the Hastern Mediterranean.^ With such a formidable threat in an 
area of such great commercial and strategic importance, Venice did not want 
to spare any of its naval weapons. The Republic was enjoying a period of 
tremendous prosperity, and it did not want to endanger valuable markets 
unnecessarily.
In 1342, Doge Andrea Dandolo led the Republic into a short-lived 
coalition and Crusade which took some action against the Turkish threat. 'Phis 
group was organized by the Pope and included the Byzantine Empire, the 
Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes, the Papal forces, the King of Cyprus, in 
addition to Venice. Venice contributed fifteen war galleys to the coalition, 
and these ships captured Smyrna on the Anatolian coast, a town which 
remained in Christian control for the next five decades. The League never 
coalesced into an effective military force, however, and the group soon
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disbanded. This military effort did nevertheless have positive results for the 
Republic. After the coalition fell apart, Venice struck an agreement with the 
Pope which called for the Republic to defend the Mediterranean for Christian 
ships. In return, the Republic received the right to retain all religious tithes 
collected during the next three years inside Venetian territory.
Black Death and a Third War with Genoa
During the !340s, Venice once again entered into a war with her longtime 
rival, Genoa. The Gcnoans had not participated in the crusading efforts 
against the Turks, even though they too had important trade links that were 
threatened by the advancing Muslims. Venice and Genoa did join together 
temporarily in July of 1345, however, when the two cities agreed to boycott 
Tartar g o o d s T h i s  action was taken in response to a Turkish attack on 
Venetians and Genoans who were trading in the Bast. The Genoans violated 
this pact almost immediately though, destroying any efforts at cooperation.
The Tartar markets were simply too lucrative to avoid, and Tartar merchants 
also provided a source of precious goods such as silk and spices.
During the 1340s, the Genoans and Venetians were in constant rivalry at 
towns such as Caffa and Soldaia. These markets were the access points to 
valuable Russian commodities such as furs and slaves, and also were a source 
of expensive Eastern luxury goods from India, and the Central and Far East. 
Because of trade frictions, Venice and Genoa came to the brink of war after 
the break up of their short lived boycott of Tartar goods. The Venetians were 
angered by the Genoan violation of the pact, and also were enraged by 
Genoan conduct in regard to Venetian residents of Trebizond. The Venetians
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charged that Genoa had not allowed traders living in the city to fortify their 
homes and settlements. In response to this complaint, the Genoans declared 
that Trebizond, as well as the entire coast of the Black Sea, was solely under 
the control of Genoa. Any Venetians who were allowed to live or trade in the 
region did so only through the beneficence of the Gcnoan government.
This claim was a direct threat to Venetian power in the Levant, and the 
Ventian leaders realized that it could not go unchallenged. If recognized, 
Venice would be giving up all her legal, political, and economic claims in the 
area. As a result, the Republic anticipated going to war with Genoa once 
again. This battle was delayed though, because in 1348, Venice was brought 
to its knees by a severe outbreak of the plague.
The Black Death which struck Venice utterly decimated the city. During 
the late Winter of 1348, Venetian convoys returning from Crimea 
unfortunately transported rats within the holds of the galleys which were 
infected with the disease. When these ships returned to the Republic, the rats 
and parasitic fleas introduced the plague into the Republic. Victims of this 
contagious ailment were afflicted by chills, fever, inflammation of lymphatic 
glands, and delirium which typically culminated in death.
Although many parts of Europe were struck by the Plague, Venice was 
hit particularly hard. As one of the principal ports linking Europe with the 
East, many rats entered into the city. The epidemic escalated steadily 
throughout the Spring, and reached horrific proportions by the early summer. 
Ignorance of the rats' role iri the transmission process, compounded by the 
problems associated with a medieval sanitation and public health system, left
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the city in a helpless position. During the hot summer months, an estimated 
five to six hundred people died within Venice each day .^
The Senate and the Doge tried to find ways to stop the disease, but the 
special government commissions which were charged with the duty of finding 
a means of prevention could offer no solutions. The Senate passed a law that 
all people who died from the plague must be buried at least five feet 
underground, outside of the central islands of the city, but it was impossible 
to carry out these measures.^7 There were simply too many dead people 
which needed to be buried. Special boats were supposed to quickly ferry the 
dead to the outlying islands of the lagoons, but it was impossible to gather the 
numerous corpses which continued to grow larger each day. Despite the best 
efforts of the boatmen, bodies often laid in homes for days. To make matters 
worse, there was an acute shortage of doctors and medical practitioners.
Many physicians had died, but many others quickly had left the city during 
the first few weeks of the outbi ak of the disease. These doctors, like many 
other inhabitants of the Republic, fled to inland areas which typically were 
spared from the plague.
The disease wiped out entire families within Venice. Fifty noble houses 
were completely destroyed, and estimates of city-wide losses range from fifty 
to sixty percent of the population.^** In terms of foreign affairs, the plague 
caused great hardship both for Venice and her primary economic and military 
rival of Genoa. As another port city, Genoa also suffered great losses from the 
rats which came in the holds of her galleys. As a result of the Bubonic Plague, 
the two cities temporarily de-escalated their confrontation over control of the
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Black Sea. This abatement of hostilities, however, would prove to be very 
short-lived. Because of the similar economic goals of Genoa and Venice, the 
Black Sea inevitably would be a troublespot for the cities. Conflict would 
arise again as soon as the cities recovered in the most minimal sense from the 
destruction of the plague.
In addition to having an impact on foreign affairs with Genoa, the Black 
Death also exacerbated a maritime personnel problem that had been 
developing the the Republic for several decades. Throughout the first half of 
the fourteenth century, Venice had begun to experience a shortage of 
oarsmen and sailors. The social prestige and position of the oarsmen had 
been declining, and the job was becoming increasingly less desirable. In 
addition, the plague of course aggravated this problem. In an effort to recruit 
more seamen, the city offered amnesty and debt forgiveness to minor 
criminals if they would agree to serve as oarsmen. In addition, the Senate 
lowered government requirements specifying the number of personnel which 
were needed on commercial galleys. Although these efforts proved to be 
moderately successful, the Republic and her fleets were suffering during the 
mid-fourteenth century. At the outbreak of the Third Genoese War, the 
Venetian galleys were undermanned, still recovering from the effects of the 
Black Death.
This scarcity of trained seamen is significant in that it reflects shifts in 
attitudes within the Republic about both commercial and foreign affairs. 
Venetian business activities always had offered the promise of great profits, 
but now with the decreasing need for merchants to travel with their
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merchandise, native Venetians were becoming less and less adept at sea 
voyaging. Many locals increasingly were being employed in the various crafts 
and industries which thrived in the Republic. Immigrants came to the 
lagoons as always, but these people were often more interested in work in 
shops on the terra firma than in working as oarsmen or sailors. To be sure, 
Venice was still a first-class naval power, but the results of the city’s gradual 
shift away from a single-minded focus on the sea would manifest themselves 
later in increased activities on the Italian Peninsula.
In the short-term though, Venice became engaged in yet another naval 
conflict w'th its rival of Genoa. Despite the fact that both powers had been 
crippled by the Great Plague, during 1350 the long-running hostilities 
between the two nations erupted once again. In that year, the Gcnoans 
captured a force of Venetian galleys which were anchored at the port of Caffa 
on Crimea in the Black Sea. Doge Andrea Dandolo sent an emissary to demand 
an explanation and reparations from the Gcnoans, but his request was 
ignored. As a result, the two powers once again entered into war.
Hostilities Begin: Negroponte
Venice assembled a sizeable fleet of thirty-five gai.cys under the 
command of Marco Ruzzini. This commander led the Venetian fleet to an 
apparent victory in the first conflict of the war. In this battle, Ruzzini's ships 
captured ten of fourteen Genoan vessels which were located in the harbor at 
Negroponte.^
Despite this gain, the battle was not entirely successful for the Venetians. 
The four Genoan ships which escaped went to the Genoan island of Chios.
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There, they joined forces with nine other galleys, sailed back to Ncgroponie, 
and returned to raze the port. These four ships were able to escape only 
because of the ineptitude and lack of discipline of the Venetian sailors.
During the initial engagement, the crewman abandoned efforts to defeat the 
entire Genoan fleet and instead began plundering the holds of the galleys 
which already had been captured. This was not typical behavior for Venetian 
sailors in naval conflicts.
There are a couple of possible explanations for these uncharacteristic 
actions. First, many of the sailors under Ruzzini's command were not 
residents of the lagoons. Following the losses of the Great Plague, there were 
only lout 80,(XX) people within all of the lands under direct Venetian 
control. ^ With this population, the traditional method of conscripting 
one-fourth of all adult males would generate a force of only approximately 
five thousand men. Since each galley was manned by approximately two 
hundred seamen, the Venetians could only have outfitted twenty-five of their 
total of thirty-five ships from within the Republic. At least ten of the ships 
were staffed by sailors from Dalmatia or other Venetian colonies. In addition, 
the prevalence of non-Venetian sailors in the Republic's forces was 
heightened by great numbers of mercenary fighters. The fraction of the 
Venetian populace which survived the plague were hardly excited by the 
opportunity to risk their lives in a foreign war. Many of the Venetians who 
were ordered to report for battle exercised their option to hire substitute 
fighters. These mercenaries proved in the battle that they were more 
interested in spoils than victory for the Doge and the Republic.
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When the Genoan fleet returned to Negroponte, they inflicted great 
damages. The Genoan galleys, led by their commander Filippo Doria, gained 
control of the port, looted the city, and captured some twenty Venetian 
merchant ships which were docked in the harbor.-™ Venice, however, was 
able to maintain control of the island because the Gcnoans did not occupy the 
island and the Venetian troops located in the citadel were never defeated or 
captured.
Following this set-back, the Venetian government took limited steps to 
punish the commanders and crew members involved in the battles. Although 
different proposals were considered, the Senate made no attempts to recover 
the spoils taken by the Venetian seamen and mercenaries. The Venetian 
rulers feared that if they impounded any booty, the mercenaries might revolt. 
In addition, the Senate know it might need to attract more mercenaries as the 
war continued, and it did not want to take a decisive step which might make 
it difficult to recruit forces at a later date.
Venice also took relatively mild steps against officials and commanders 
involved in the incident. The bailo at Negroponte, Tommaso Viadro, was 
brought up on charges but was acquitted. Ruzzini faced a somewhat larger 
penalty in that he was deprived of his position as Captain General of the Sea, 
but he was not subjected to the beheading he could have suffered under the 
provisions of fourteenth century Venetian law. Neither of these men were 
ever appointed to a military office again, but they received very mild 
punishments when measured against the penalties they could have innirred.
This initial battle and retaliation was by no means the end of the war.
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Venice realized that she would need help to battle with the Genoans, and 
quickly set out to gather allies and new mercenary forces. Many powers 
were either jealous or fearful of the Genoans, and these nations rallied to 
Venice's call for assistance. For example, Hmpcror John Cantacuzcnos, also 
known as John VI, offered thirty fully-manned galleys. The Hmpcror also 
offered a contingent of eighteen ships on the condition that Venetians would 
pay two-thirds of the cost of using the boats.-** * In return, the Fmperor 
demanded that if the Venetians were successful they must destroy the 
Genoese colony of Galata located next to Constantinople, and then give back 
the islands of Chios and Mitylene which the Genoans had taken from him. In 
this way, a Venetian victory would strengthen Constantinople both 
economically and militarily.
Venice also received assistance from the Iberian Peninsula. The Kingdom 
of Aragon was located there, a nation which was another military and 
commercial rival of Genoa. The Catalans had been involved in a struggle with 
Genoa over control of the island of Sardinia, and also were emerging as a 
stronger rival in trade in the Western Mediterranean. The Catalans agreed to 
give Venice eighteen armed galleys, and also agreed to lease Venice an 
additional dozen ships at the rate of 1,000 ducats per month. To augment this 
force of twenty-odd ships, Venice recruited enough men and mercenaries to 
arm another contingent of approximately forty ships.-*^
Th e Battle of the Bosphorus
This coalition took time to form, so very little military action took place in 
1350. In fact, the treaty with the Catalans was not signed until the summer
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of 1351, so the next significant battle of the Third Genoese War occurred in 
1352. In mid-February of that year, the fleets of Genoa and the allied 
Venetians forces clashed near the Gcnoan colony at Galata at the mouth of the 
Bosphorus. In this battle, each side was ably led by a courageous and 
talented admiral. The Venetians were under the direction of Nicolo’ Pisani, 
and the Genoans were commanded by Paganino Doria. Although the Venetian 
armada was comprised of ships of several nations, the outcome of the battle 
which ensued near Galata was decided almost entirely by the ships and 
sailors from Venice proper and the city of Genoa.
The Venetians had an elaborate and ingenious battle plan, but the 
directions were never carried out in the actual Battle of the Bosphorus. The 
Venetians had intended to meet the Iberian ships with some of their galleys 
off the coast of Sicily before Genoa sent any ships Eastward. Once united with 
the Catalans, the Venetians ideally hoped to set up a blockade which would 
keep the enemy from advancing towards the Black Sea and Straits of the 
Bosphorus. This plan was soon changed though because the Genoans sailed 
past Sicily with a fleet of some sixty ships before the arrival of the Venetians 
or the Iberians. These ships set off in pursuit of Commander Pisani, who was 
engaged in small scale plundering in the Aegean. At this time, Pisani also was 
busy preparing with the Byzantine galleys for an attack on the city of Pcra.
When Pisani received communications informing him of the size of the 
Genoan fleet, he began a quick retreat back to the ravaged port of 
Negroponte. There, Pisani landed on the island and sank his galleys so they 
would not be vulnerable to Doria's fleet. When Doria arrived at Negroponte,
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Pisani led a successful defense of the port, repelling a Genoan attack. Because 
Doria received news that both the Iberians and another Venetian force were 
bearing down on the Aegean, the Genoans abandoned their efforts to capture 
Pisani. Instead, Doria led his ships back to Pera. Freed of the Genoan threat, 
Pisani liberated his ships, and combined his forces with the galleys which had 
just arrived from the Central Mediterranean. Although the Venetian would 
have liked to link-up with his Byzantine allies and lead the assembled 
armada on a direct assault against the Genoans at Pera, the onset of winter 
made an attack impossible. The Venetian force could not fight effectively in 
the fierce weather and unfavorable winds, so Pisani led his ships back to the 
island of Crete.
After replenishing their stores, making minor repairs on the ships, and 
waiting for favorable weather, the Venetian armada left Crete in February of 
1352. After departing, Pisani linked up with the Byzantine fleet and set off 
for the Straits of Bosphorus. There, on February 13th, the Venetian fleet 
faced off against the Genoans in one of the most brutal and bloody naval 
battles ever fought. The two navies met in winter during the middle of a 
harsh storm. Although the battle began during daylight, the fighting 
continued on into the night. As the hostilities continued for hours, it became 
increasingly difficult even to identify allies and enemies, much less coordinate 
any cohesive battle strategy. Many men from both sides were killed or lost in 
the rough seas, and few prisoners were ever taken.
At the onset of the battle, Doria had laid an effective defense at the 
mouth of the Bosphorus. In setting up his ships, the Genoan commander had
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stationed himself so any admiral who tried to advance against his position 
would endanger his ships because he would need to compress the vessels in 
his front lines. Pisani saw that it would be difficult to engage successfully, 
and he suggested to his fellow officers from Aragon and the Bzyantinc Empire 
that any attack should be postponed until morning. Unfortunately, the 
Iberian Admiral, Santa Paola, refused to heed the request.-'-’ The Aragonese 
fleet broke ranks from the rest of the armada, and set forth on a frontal 
attack into the teeth of the Gcnoan trap. Pisani did not want to begin the 
battle under these conditions, but his hand was forced, lie followed Santa 
Paola and engaged against the Genoans.
The coalition fleet of the Republic soon fell apart. The Bzyantines never 
really entered into the fracas, and the Iberians were quickly disposed of by 
the combined power of the Genoan forces and the unfavorable weather. As a 
result, the remainder of the battle became a conflict between Venetian and 
Genoan forces. One of the sides was able to set some of their enemy's ships 
on fire, but the gusting wind quickly spread the blaze across the waters so 
both forces were struck by the flames.
The fighting was brutal, and the enemies were hampered by the weather 
and darkness. Both sides suffered great losses, but eventually the Venetians 
had to withdraw from the confrontation. Retreating in the cold night by the 
light of blazing ships, the Venetian forces finally took what ships had 
survived and left the battle scene. The fleet of the Republic had experienced 
tremendous destruction. Most of her galleys were lost, and approximately 
1,500 men were killed.-™ This figure would be a high number in any time or
49
historical situation, but the deaths were especially painful because of the 
previous loss of young men in the Great Plague.
Although the Genoans won the battle in a tactical and military sense, they 
certainly had no cause for rejoicing. They too had lost many of their ships 
and hundreds of their most able young sailors. Doria knew he was in no 
position to push the course of the battle, and he set forth on an effort to 
regroup and recover. Despite all of their losses though, the Genoans had 
repelled the Venetian threat, and could be relatively confident that they were 
safe at Pera. In keeping control of Pera, the Genoans would be helped by 
their ally, the Turkish Soidan, Orkhan I. The l urk had ambitions of extending 
his influence into Europe, and wanted to do so at the expense of the Byzantine 
Emperor and the Venetians. The Turkish Emperor gave supplies to the 
Genoans, and also sent soldiers.
The Venetians knew they had no chance of gaining control of Pera under 
these conditions, so the ships of the coalition departed westward. The 
Bzyantine Emperor, realizing that any hope of destroying Galata was gone, 
submitted to his Genoan enemy. He agreed to permit the Genoans to fortify 
both Pera and the colony at Galata in return for a cessation of hostilities. In 
addition, the Emperor agreed to allow the Genoans and '1'urks to keep any 
nation from trading within the Sea of Azov. Although these provisions were 
very undesirable to the Byzantine Emperor, in reality, he had no choice but to 
accept the Genoan proposal.
Further Hostilities
This momentous confrontation at the Battle of the Bosphorus in no way
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ended the Third Genoese War. In fact, if anything, the hostilities escalated 
after the bloodbath. As had happened in the past, a major victory by one of 
the two great rivals only inspired the other city to mount an increased 
offensive against its foe. In an effort to exact revenge, both Pisani and the 
Iberians eagerly shifted their focus to the island of Sardinia. The Venetians 
had better luck in the Mediterranean, and there they won a decisive victory 
off of the coast of Lojera. This battle took place on August of 1353, when the 
Genoese fleet was surprised by the Venetian galleys which were 
accompanying Aragonese ships near Sardinia. Led again by their able 
commander, Nicolo' Pisani, the Venetians quickly attacked the unsuspecting 
Genoan forces. Although the Genoans fought valiantly for their captain, 
Commander Antonio Grimaldi, they lost approximately forty ships out of a 
fleet of fifty-eight to Venetian capture or destruction.-^
This defeat caused a great panic within Genoa. Surprisingly, the entire 
city went into a depression, and citizens were fearful that the setback marked 
the end of their power and influence. The Genoan people were convinced that 
Venice had gained control of the entire Mediterranean, and would proceed to 
strangle their enemy by excluding them from any trade or commercial 
activity with the East. In addition, the Genoans believed that the Venetians 
would be able to starve out the city by cutting the Genoans from any external 
food source. Since Genoa had little indigenous agricultural productive 
capacity, it believed that if the city were cut off from its import supplies, the 
nation would quickly topple.
As a result, the Genoans believed they had to take drastic action to avert
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rapid doom. The city thus offered its independence to the Lord of Milan, 
Giovanni Viscounti, who immediately accepted the proposal in October of 
1353. Under the provisions of the agreement between the two powers, Milan 
gained complete control of Genoa in exchange for a guarantee that local laws 
would still apply within the submissive city. In addition, Genoan ships would 
still be able fly the banner of the patron saint of the city, St. George, in 
addition to the flag of Milan.
Venice, of course, was both angered and resentful. They had fought 
against the Gcnoans for decades, and they emerged from their conflict with no 
gains or control over their enemy. To make matters worse, their rival Milan 
had benefited from the sacrifices of the Republic and had acquired a great 
prize without ever sending troops into battle. This gain allowed the Visconti 
to continue an advance on the mainland which promised to bring him into 
eventual conflict with the Venetians. With the two powers effectively 
bordering each other through the Venetian puppet government in Padua, 
Venice now saw Milan emerging as a mainland version of the maritime 
enemy of Genoa she had just defeated.
In an effort to check the spread of the Milanese influence, the Venetians 
once again attempted diplomatic efforts. They tried unsuccessfully to form an 
enduring coalition of mainland powers who would be natural enemies of 
Milan. These states included Ferrara, Verona, Mantua, Montferrat, Bohemia, 
and Venice's own Padua.*™ Although the Republic temporarily was able to 
garner support for the alliance, the group never became a functional reality. 
Many of the states only agreed to join after Venice had given them bribes,
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and loyalty within the group was lacking. After a short time, the Milanese 
ruler, Giovanni Visconti, was able to destroy the coalition by offering similar 
bribes to the leaders of the various other mainland powers.
With the break-up of the anti-Milanese alliance, the Genoese encouraged 
the Visconti to mount an attack against the Venetians. Old hatred for the 
Republic ran deep, and the Gcnoans would have enjoyed seeing their new 
ruler destroy their historical, political and economic rival. The Milanese ruler, 
however, did not want an immediate confrontation with the troops of San 
Marco. The Venetians had proved how effective and persistent they could be 
in battle, and the Visconti saw reason to risk an unnecessary fight. As a 
result, the Viscoi.ti sent an emissary to the Venetian Doge, Andrea Dandolo, to 
appeal for peace between Genoa and the Republic.
This ambassador was Francesco Petrarch, the famous poet, writer, 
diplomat, and humanist. Petrarch was a personal friend of the well-educated 
Doge Dandolo, and had personally asked the Doge several times in the past to 
work for a truce with Genoa. Petrarch believed, quite rightly, that the 
Venetian-Genoan struggle was destroying any chance for Italian unity and 
strength, and that any winner in a struggle between the two powers would 
emerge too weakened to ever defend and maintain control of their 
possessions. As the representative of the Visconti, Petrarch appealed not only 
to the Doge, but to the entire city of Venice. He repeated his appeal for a 
truce to preserve Italian unity, and explained that the Visconti would be 
willing to agree to a generous settlement if the Venetians would end their 
hostilities with Genoa. Despite his many talents, however, Petrarch's appeal
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was not well received. The Venetians were still angry that the Gcnoans had 
turned control of their city over to the Visconti, and the citizens of the 
Republic were in no mood to lay down their arms after being deprived of 
their spoils after their victory at La Lojera.
Instead, the Venetians increasingly were becoming willing to continue 
the fight against Genoa, despite her ties with Milan. The Venetians 
interpreted the Milanese ruler's generous peace offer as a sign of trepidation; 
if he did not want to fight the Venetians on the mainland, he must not think 
he could win a military confrontation. The Venetians therefore gained 
increased confidence, and prepared to continue their struggle with Genoa, 
regardless of any alliance it might have. This attitude was strengthened by 
the fact that Genoa had been continuing to battle against the Venetians, 
despite the control of Milan and despite the words of peace from the Visconti. 
During January of 1354, the Genoans had already sent a new fleet into the 
Adriatic, and this armada proceeded to raid several local towns and engage 
Venetia ships in the area.^
The first of these encounters occurred off the Dalmatian coast, as the 
Genoan galleys, led by the veteran captain, Paganino Doria, stormed the 
islands of Curzola and Lesina. In this raid, the Genoans attacked the islands, 
caused a great deal of destruction, and then fled before the Venetian ships in 
the area could counterattack. In response to this Genoan action, the 
Venetians sent out an additional contingent of ships to defend the straits of 
Otranto. The other Venetian ships in the area, led by Doria’s old adversary, 
Nicolo' Pisani, tried to catch the Genoan raiders and engage in a battle.
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Despite their efforts, this Venetian armada was never able to confront 
Doria's ships. Eventually, Pisani decided to join an Aragonese siege of 
Alghero. Although this may have seemed like an excellent way to take 
advantage of the Genoans' reluctance to fight, Pisani's decision to leave the 
Adriatic proved to be a grave error. His decision began a series of events 
which led to a great Venetian defeat.
When Doria heard that Pisani had sailed cast to Sardinia, he advanced to 
the Adriatic, where he evaded Venetian attempts to constrain him. Once in 
the Adriatic, Doria struck along the Istrian coast. Getting behind the Venetian 
defenses, Doria made a bold attack. He assaulted and captured Parcnzo along 
the Istrian coast, located only one hundred kilometers from the Lagoons.
When the Venetians heard of this strike on Parenzo, they took decisive 
steps to defend the Republic. For example, they designated a special 
magistrate who was responsible for overseeing all Venetian defensive 
preparations. As had been done before, the Venetians also passed a measure 
which brought in funds through a system of forced loans, and the government 
as well as some wealthy families armed military galleys to defend the 
Republic. Unlike the Genbans, Venice had no intention of appealing to another 
city for protection or assistance. They put great chains across the entrance to 
the Lagoons at the Lido entrance between San Nicolo' and Santa Andrea, and 
prepared to meet Doria's forces in a battle which would determine the future 
of their city.
This great confrontation, however, never occurred. Doria was bold, but 
he was not foolhardy. He knew the Venetians would be a formidable foe
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fighting for their lives in their home waters, so he wisely did not push an 
offensive on the city. Doria retreated out of the Adriatic, and returned to the 
waters of the Aegean. Meanwhile, Pisani's forces arrived in the area after 
being recalled in earnest from Sardinia. Pisani wanted to make Doria pay for 
his advance into the Adriatic, and he hoped to meet the Gcnoans near their 
settlement at Chios, one of their principal resupplying posts in the area.
Pisani found Doria in port at Chios, and immediately called for the Gcnoan 
commander to engage in battle. Doria, however, refused. Me was waiting for 
an anticipated reinforcement armada of twelve galleys, and was not going to 
fight Pisani until the other ships had arrived. Therefore, Nicolo’ Pisani 
decided to leave for the port of Portolungo, near the island of Sapienza. It 
was already autumn, and the Venetian commander reasoned that both he and 
Doria would delay their confrontation until more favorable conditions arrived 
in spring.
The Debacle at Portolungo
Pisani was wrong, and his mistake cost him dearly. When the Venetians 
arrived at Portolungo, Pisani sent a small fleet of only twelve to fifteen 
galleys under the direction of Nicolo' Querini to hold guard over the mouth of 
the harbor.58 He then took the rest of his ships, some forty boats of various 
sizes, and bound them together for winter. This action left the Venetians 
unable to defend their position from any attack of significant magnitude.
The Genoans soon discovered the opportunity to attack the Venetian 
ships. Many historical accounts and folktales exist which give various 
explanations of how Doria found out about his enemies' situation. Some relate
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a story of how Doria's nephew Giovanni spied the Venetian boats lashed 
together during a fortuitous jaunt in a light reconnaissance boat that he had 
taken on a sail during one boring autumn afternoon. Other tales explain that 
the Genoans saw the ships when returning to shore after a storm forced them 
to abort an attempt to leave Chios for the winter. Regardless, Doria 
discovered his chance to attack the Venetians and set forth to follow up on his 
victory at Parcnzo.
The Genoan had no intention of wasting his opportunity. On the morning 
of November 4, 1354, Doria attacked the Venetians with his entire armada. 
This assault was a complete surprise to the Venetians, who were utterly 
unprepared to meet the challenge. Many of the Venetian galleys were not 
even manned as their crews had moved to quarters on the shore. Those boats 
which had crews were outnumbered and taken aback by the swift Genoan 
advance. The protective squadron was ineffective, and Doria's ships viciously 
descended upon their enemies. Every single one of the fifty-six Venetian 
ships, including over thirty galleys, was captured.*’1-' Some sailors were able 
to escape to Modone, but others met less fortunate fates. Many were taken 
prisoner, and over four hundred were killed.
This was a complete defeat and disaster for Venice. Within the lagoons, 
the leaders of the Republic were understandably shaken. They had been 
forced to prepare to defend the city from the Genoans because their fleet was 
off in Sardinia; before the fleet returned, it was destroyed. People were 
outraged at Querini, as he had not fulfilled his responsibilities at Portolungo to 
defend the mouth of the port. His performance was inadequate, and some
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even charged that he had deliberately allowed the Genoans to penetrate his 
defenses. As a result, Querini was stripped of his commend and forced to pay 
a considerable fine. He was also prohibited from holding any other office for 
the next six years. Pisani likewise was subject to harsh punishment, lie had 
to pay a large fine, was stripped of his command, and was forbidden from 
holding another Venetian military command for the remainder of his iife. As 
supreme commander of the operation, Pisani was ultimately responsible for 
all events, and had to answer for the Venetian defeat.
Despite the severity of the military defeat, Venice was able to survive the 
defeat at Portolungo far better than might be expected. The Visconti in Milan 
still wanted peace between Venice and Genoa, and he was willing to offer the 
Republic a generous settlement to come to terms of peace. Milan was more 
concerned with advancing on land in the northern portion of tu? Italian 
Peninsula, and she did not want to provoke the Venetians to begin efforts to 
revive their aborted alliance with the various rivals of Milan. Venetian 
diplomats thus were able to forge an agreement which called for a three-year 
settlement between Venice and the Genoan/Milanese coalition. Under the 
terms of the pact, the two sides would refrain from any military hostilities, 
and neither Venice nor Genoa would send any ships to Tana during the 
duration of the truce.0^
Considering the fact that Venice's entire navy had just been destroyed, 
the city escaped rather easily. After proceeding with the aforementioned 
military charges against their commanders, the Venetians began an effort to 
rebuild their navy and maintain their political arid military influence in the
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Adriatic and on the Peninsula. The Republic set about the task of building 
replacement ships, and hired mercenaries to help maintain her defenses. 
Interestingly enough, the three year peace between Genoa and Venice lasted 
far longer than one might have expected, with the two historical adversaries 
refraining from combat for another twenty-five years.
An Internal Threat: A Second Attempt at Revolution 
'I’his period of adjustment also marked a transition in terms of Venetian 
leadership. During the first week in September, 1354, Doge Andrea Dandolo 
died at the age of forty-seven. Mis passing was a great loss to the Republic, as 
Dandolo was a wise well-educated man who proved to be a far better leader 
than his successor, Marin Falier. Although Dandolo was not particularly 
well-liked at the time of his death, his many literary, historical and legal 
contributions left him an enduring legacy of accomplishment which has given 
him a respected position in Venetian history. Dandolo was helpful in keeping 
the various classes in the city unified after the tremendous military defeat at 
Portolungo. Andrea also helped the Venetians have confidence that they were 
justified in their military actions, and cultivated civic patriotism and belief 
that the Venetians would eventually overcome their hardships with the 
Genoans.
The new Doge, Marino Falier, was elected with great confidence and 
enthusiam. Unlike the lawyer-humanist-scholar Dandolo, Falier had made his 
name primarily as a successful military commander. He was a member of a 
famous and venerable Venetian noble family, and was serving at the lime of 
his election as the Venetian Ambassador to the Pope, located in Avignon. The
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newly elected Doge luid been a prominent leader of Venetian fleets and 
military expeditions, including an effort which successfully crushed a 
rebellion at Zara. In addition, Falier had ruled as the Venetian podesta' in 
several places, including Padua, Treviso, and Chioggia. Finally, the new 
Doge had played an instrumental role in helping to undermine and defeat the 
revolutionary efforts of Bajamonte Tiepolo. Without question, prior to his 
election, Falier had given a lifetime of service on behalf of his state.
Unfortunately, Falier's dogeship proved to be a dismal failure. Falier is 
directly responsible for a series of events which culminated in his 
unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Republic and replace the government 
with a despotic system of rule.
As he began his term of office, the Doge became increasingly unsatisfied 
with constraints on his power imposed upon him by the ruling aristocracy in 
the Republic. During his years of service to the state, Falier had grown 
convinced that the noble elite in the Republic was using its constitutionally 
granted power to protect its own narrow interests, not govern the state 
wisely and justly. Some traditional folktales of Venice tell of Falier's 
dissatisfaction with the city's system of justice after a young nobleman went 
free after insulting the fidelity of the Doge's wife. These stories are almost 
certainly unfounded, but it is true that Falier and other noblemen had become 
convinced that a monarchical and autocratic ruler was needed in the city. As 
a result, Falier began to organize an attempt to reclaim control of the state 
from the power-sharing republican system of government in the city.
In this effort, the Doge was quite interested in the support of Stefano
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Chiazza, dctto Ghiaza. Falicr was eager to win this support because of Ghiaza's 
contact and control over the Arsenal workers. These men had long served as 
bodyguards for the Doge during various civic and religious events, and the 
arsenalotti had historically been very faithful to the Doge. Falicr and Ghiaza 
proceeded to formulate a plan which hinged on three factors--an imaginary 
threat of a foreign invasion by Genoa, a general confusion which would resu.'t 
within tne city, and the decisive support of the arsenalotti. This plan was 
supposed to allow Falicr to murder his adversaries and emerge as the 
Monarch of Venice.
In addition, the Doge recruited the help of Filippo Calendario, one of the 
men who helped to supervise construction on the Ducal Palace. Calendario 
was also a shipowner, sharing a link with many of the other conspirators to 
maritime activities. In fact, most of the men involved in the plot were 
typically middle or upper-middle class citizens who enjoyed the support of 
maritime workers and seamen.^-’ Falicr reasoned that these individuals 
would share a resentment against the particular nobles he was blaming for a 
variety of evils in the administration of the Republic.
Falier's great idea never was realized, and he, not the nobles, wound up 
as the victim of the coup attempt. Naturally, the plan was to be carried out 
in the utmost secrecy, with the conspirators using surprise as a tool to aid in 
the overthrow of the government. As might be expected, however, word of 
the coup leaked out. One of the men involved in the plan told a friend that 
he should stay off the streets on the evening of April 15th because it would 
be dangerous. This friend went to the Doge and warned him that people
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might be trying to commit some sort of attack or trouble on that evening. The 
Doge of course dismissed the man, but the man continued to tell his story to 
others. Eventually the men on the Council of Ten became suspicious because 
they were picking up rumors of upcoming trouble from several sections of the 
city.
The Council of Ten immediately began to probe for the truth. This 
secretive institution, established after the Tiepolo attack on the government, 
was charged with the responsibility of protecting the security of the 
Constitution and Republic. As a result, the members of the Council met 
secretly to conduct a preliminary examination of information they had 
gathered about possible subversive activities. At this meeting, held at the 
monastery of San Salvatore, the members of the Council correctly concluded 
that they had reason to suspect that the Doge was planning to fabricate a 
foreign affairs crisis and then instigate a coup d' ctal .^4
Acting upon this suspicion, the members of the Council of Ten shared 
their ideas during a larger gathering with other government official and 
citizens. During this meeting, the assembled groups took steps to insure that 
they would be able to counter any attempt to overthrow the Republic, and 
special plans were drawn up for the night of April 15th. These preparations 
included the arming of loyal men from all quarters of the city to defend the 
Republic. These individuals were ordered to gather in the Piazza, and an 
estimated force of 7,500 men were available to repel the threat on the night 
of the planned c o u p In addition, a smaller corps of horsemen was 
assembled to provide a mobile strike-force to deal with an unexpected or
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faraway problems.
On the night of the planned attack, April 15th, the defenders intervened 
to preempt the assault. Many of the conspirators were arrested and jailed to 
await trials for treason. In the legal proceedings which followed, several of 
the prominent figures in the rebellion were sentenced to be hanged from the 
windows of the ducal palace facing the Piazzetta.
The defenders of the Republic also apprehended Doge Falicr. The Council 
of Ten was reluctant to issue a sentence against the highest Venetian 
government official without additional input, so it asked the government to 
commission a special group called the zonta to aid in the investigations. This 
committee consisted a group of twenty trusted and esteemed citizens from 
the city. These twenty individuals, along with one of the State’s Attorneys 
and the Council of Ten, were charged with the task of trying Doge Falier. If 
necessary, this group also would carry out any punishment against the 
Venetian leader.
The members of the zonta tried Falier, who admitted his guilt in a full 
confession. This was a crime against the state of the highest magnitude, and 
on April 17,1355, the Doge was beheaded as sentenced within the Ducal 
Palace. The body was buried in an unmarked grave at the Falier family 
vault outside of the city, and almost all of the former ruler's assets were 
confiscated by the state. The only wealth of Falier which was not seized was 
a sum of 2,000 ducats which was given to his widow.*" Thus, despite being 
convinced that the citizens of the city would rally around him in the uprising, 
Falier's effort to overthrow the Republic proved to be a disaster. Both he and
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The members of the zonta tried Falier, who admitted his guilt in a full 
confession. This was a crime against the state of the highest magnitude, and 
on April 17, 1355, the Doge was beheaded as sentenced within the Ducal 
Palace. The body was buried in an unmarked grave at the Falier family 
vault outside of the city, and almost all of the former ruler's assets were 
confiscated by the state. The only wealth of Falier which was not seized was 
a sum of 2,000 ducats which was given to his widow.*”  Thus, despite being 
convinced that the citizens of the city would rally around him in the uprising, 
Falier's effort to overthrow the Republic proved to be a disaster. Both he and
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his supporters were destroyed, and their actions only led to their own 
downfall. In a characteristic fashion, the Republic proved to be stable and 
enduring, and as had happened before, a coup attempt was thwarted.
In this manner, the Venetian internal structure proved stronger than that 
of her foreign adversaries. This example provides insight into the inherent 
stability of the Venetian system of government. Whereas many Italian 
city-states during the mid-fourteenth century had fallen under the control of 
autocratic leaders, Venice had retained a republican structure. This type of 
government proved to command a great deal of loyalty from the citizens of 
Venice.
In retrospect, it is easy to see why some adherents of Falier were 
attracted to the idea of an autocratic state. Most notably, the citizens of 
Venice could contrast their city with Milan ar.d Genoa, two powers controlled 
by despots which had just defeated Venice in a foreign war. The 
time-consuming Venetian governance structure must have seemed too 
bureaucratic to meet the dynamic challenges of fourteenth century 
administration. Republican governments in one sense are always less 
efficient than autocratic systems, with decision-making taking longer due to 
the greater citizen participation. Although these republican governments 
allow a nation to have checks-and-balances to help prevent the abuse of 
power, many citizens in Venice must have questioned whether or not their 
city could afford not to have a despotic administration. These individuals 
must have reasoned that a more autocratic government would provide 
stronger military leadership against foreign adversaries, and that an
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authoritarian administration would allow for faster responses against 
enemies. A despot would not have to debate or ask for the approval of any 
councils or committees, and the Venetians would be able to respond more 
quickly and fight more successfully against the Gcnoans.
The efforts of Falier and the nobles who wanted to move Venice towards 
a despotic system like that of her rivals were thwarted, however, by the 
safeguards built into the republican system. The leaders of the plot were all 
publicly executed, and several of the principal informants were given 
permission to protect themselves from any acts vengeance by being able to 
carry weapons within Venice. Far from being outmoded by the times, the 
Venetian Republic survived the tests of the fourteenth century and would 
endure for some four hundred more years. Lasting until its overthrow at the 
hands of Napoleon on May 12, 1797, the Venetian Republic still stands as the 
most successfully lasting republic ever.
After Falier’s execution, Venice tried to stabilize both internally and 
externally. Only three days after Marino's death, on April 21, 1 t h e  
Republic elected a new Dogc.*^ This new leader was named Giovanni 
Gradenigo, and he was seventy years old at the time of his selection. 
Gradenigo was charged with the responsibility of leading the Venetian 
recovery, so he was eager to solve the city's problems with Milan and Genoa. 
The years of war between the rivals had taken a huge toll in terms of both 
human and fiscal resources, and Doge Gradenigo wanted to arrange a truce 
with the enemies of the city. In addition, external foreign conditions also
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were conducive for a cessation of hostilities. The Visconti likewise was eager 
to come to a settlement, as the battles also were becoming incrca.ingly costly
for him.
At this time, Milan was ruled by a triumvirate of Visconti brothers.
These individuals had assumed power after the death of their uncle, the 
former archbishop and lord of the city, Giovanni Visconti. Facing a threat to 
their security, the Visconti brothers asked Venice to agree to call an end to 
the fighting and enter into truce negotiations. Once discussions began, Venice 
and Milan quickly were able to come to terms. The Third Genoese War came 
to an end on June 1, 1355, the hostilities between Venice and Genoa were 
halted once again.
The treaty which ended the conflict between the powers spelled out 
specific responsibilities of each city, however the terms included in the pact 
were not very restrictive. Principally, each city agreed to keep its ships out 
of the Sea of Azov for a period of three years, and also agreed to keep out of 
the home waters of its rival. In addition, both powers placed a 1 (X),(KK) gold 
florin security pledge with a neutral city that would be lost if they broke the 
terms of the treaty.^  Hi is treaty was very generous to the Venetians in 
light of their destruction at Portolungo, and the Genoans were not happy with 
the terms as negotiated by the Visconti of Milan. Despite their objections, 
however, the Genoans were under the control of Milan, so they too were 
willing to come to peace. This agreement did breed hostility though against 
the Milanese within Genoa, a contempt which would soon surface in an effort 
by the Genoan citizens to regain autonomy over their city.
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This Gcnoan discontent produced a revolution against the Visconti in 
1356, an event which was of considerable significance to Venice. Her 
principal historic rival was now focu ' on an internal struggle, not on a 
competition with Venice. As a result, the Republic was able to rebuild its 
naval fleet which had been destroyed at Portolungo. In addition, Venice was 
able to start regaining her market position within the European Pastern trade. 
Venice also encouraged her diplomats to negotiate mutual commercial 
agreements with the nations of the east, and business treaties were signed 
with the rulers in places such as Egypt, Flanders, and Beirut.™ Overall, 
Venice's naval and commercial maritime enterprises were able to enjoy a 
time of growth and recovery during the years following the peace treaty with 
Genoa.
Venice, however, was not free from foreign problems. As the Republic 
continued to have an increasing interest in affairs on the terra firma, she 
began to encounter new political and economic rivals. Although Venice could 
enjoy the advantages of having territorial possessions, the city would now 
face challenges which would force it to act decisively to keep control of new 
areas of the Republic.
For example, in 1356, King Lajos of Hungary led his troops into Friuli. 
The king led this expedition in an effort to seize control of all Venetian 
holdings on the eastern shores of the Adriatic . Lajos previously had tried to 
make a similar claim, but the Venetians were able to avoid a direct 
confrontation during the middle of their struggle against Genoa by using some 
adroit diplomacy. In 1356, however, the Hungarian would not be dissuaded.
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lie sent his armies into Venetian territory, focusing the main thrust of his 
attack directly against the city of Venice. In this action, the King wisely 
approached Padua in an effort to get the city to break its agreement with 
Venice and join in the struggle against the Republic. Luckily for the 
Venetians, the Paduans did not accept this offer at this time. If they had, it 
would have given Venice another front to defend, a front bordering directly 
on the city. Despite the lack of Paduan support, King Lajos enjoyed some 
success on his own, conquering the Conegliano and Sacile. In addition, the 
Hungarian laid siege to the Venetian town of Treviso, located north of Venice 
some some ten miles inland along the Sile River.
This siege at Treviso soon took on added significance when Doge 
Gradenigo died. Ironically, the man whom the Venetians elected to succeed 
Gradenigo, Giovanni Dolfin, was trapped inside of Treviso. During August of 
1356, the newly elected leader was able to slip out of the embattled city, 
avoiding the Hungarian troops which were besieging it.'^ Upon returning to 
the Ducal Palace, Dolfin ascended to the Dogeship.
Doge Dolfin and Further Problems in Hungary
The new doge immediately was confronted with several foreign affairs 
problems. Despite the best efforts of Venetian diplomats and supporters 
within the city, Padua eventually threw off its Venetian domination and gave 
its support to Lajos. The cities of Scrravalle and Asolo also had fallen to the 
advancing Hungarian armies, adding to the Venetian problem s.^ Finally, the 
city of Treviso almost fell without a fight when an attempt to betray Venice 
and capitulate to the Hungarians nearly succeeded. This defection plan was
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thwarted, however, giving the Venetians a small victory.^-
Although the Venetians valiantly tried to turn the tide of events which 
were plaguing their government, their efforts were ineffective. The Republic 
sent troops to try to regain or ravage Padua, but this battalion had little 
effect. The Venetians were able to impose some economic sanctions against 
the Paduans, but their former ally withstood the punishment and remained a 
supporter of the Hungarians. In a desperate effort to win time to regroup, the 
Venetians accepted a peace proposal that was proposed by the Pope. 'Phis 
agreement only lasted for five months, however, and Venice and the Kingdom 
of Hungary soon were at war again.
Open hostilities broke out in the Spring of 1357 when the Hungarian 
armies launched a second offensive after the Haster holiday. Breaking the 
papal truce, the Hungarian troops once again made an attack on Venetian 
possessions on the mainland. This advance gained ground, and only a few 
Venetian cities were able to maintain strong resistance against the invaders. 
Both Castelfranco and Oderzo were able to repel the Hungarians, as did 
Treviso.^ The situation in Treviso remained precarious, however, and 
Venice could not feel confident about the long term prospects of its 
possession.
To make matters worse, Venice also could not feel safe about her own 
security. Although a few cities had been able to withstand the Hungarian 
advance, King Lajos steadily was gaining control of most of the shores of the 
lagoons. The Hungarians were making preparations an invasion, and Venice 
was hastily preparing to resist any attack. The Venetians sunk wooden posts
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into the waters around the city to hamper advancing military ships, and also 
outlawed any boat travel within the lagoons. The Hungarian invaders had 
clearly advanced to a point where they were threatening the future of the 
Republic. liven if the citizens could keep the Hungarians out of their city, the 
invaders might be able to strangle Venice by cutting off all of her commercial 
trade to the mainland while imposing a blockade against ships from the Hast.
As a result, Doge Dolphin tried to find a diplomatic solution with King 
Lajos. The Dogr knew that Venice might not be able to withstand a full-scale 
attack, and feared the bloodshed that would accompany any sort of invasion. 
In addition, Venice was running out of money in the civic treasury. The Doge 
therefore sent representative to King Lajos. These men were supposed to 
explain that Venice did not want to maintain a hostile relationship with the 
King, and were supposed to find out how generous the Hungarian would be in 
agreeing to a truce.
King Lajos did not greet the ambassadors with open arms, as he was in no 
hurry to stop his successful military campaign. The King had won victories in 
many areas including Zara, Spalato, Friuli, and VenetoJ5 The Hungarian 
realized that he held the upper hand, and would not lay down his arms unless 
the Venetians agreed to give him possession of the goal of his military 
campaign: title to all of Dalmatia. If the Venetians did cede over this land, 
they would turn over control of Dalmatian territory which stretched from the 
eastern border of Istria all the way south to Durrazzo. In return, Venice 
would then be able to keep Istria, and the King would remove all of his 
Hungarian troops from the Italian Peninsula north of Venice.
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These demands were carried back to the Venetian government. There, 
several committees which were responsible for coordinating Venetian 
military actions heard and discussed the proposal. Naturally, many leaders 
were enraged, and insisted the the Republic should resist the Hungarians at 
all costs. These individuals argued that giving up the territory in question 
would be tantamount to cutting the throat of the Republic. Dalmatia was one 
of the main reasons Venice had always been such a strong naval power; the 
region supplied almost all of Venice’s lumber and was also a great source of 
seamen. This faction pushed to continue in the military struggle against King 
Lajos. These individuals pointed out that Venice always had been able to 
persevere in the past. This was only one more time that the forces of St.
Mark would defeat a foreign enemy.
Reality, however, undermined the boasts of this faction. The Hungarians 
had not experienced a great deal of trouble advancing on the mainland, and it 
was difficult to see how the Venetians could be expected to drive these 
invaders out of their newly conquered possessions. Moreover, the 
Hungarians did not even need to attack Venice to cause her great hardship.
By blockading the Republic's outlets to the Sea and mainland, the Hungarians 
could slowly weaken Venice until it would be even less able to resist an 
attack. The Venetian leaders who wanted to accept the King's offer, albeit 
grudgingly, argued that Dalmatia realistically was lost. They asserted that 
Venice should keep control of her loyal mainland possessions outside of 
Dalmatia and assure the survival of the nation. After much arguing, the 
faction favoring peace won the debate, and the Republic signed a peace treaty
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with the King in February of 1358.^
In signing this treaty, Venice gave up control of lands which had been its 
possessions for centuries. These areas were valuable sources of raw materials 
and human talent as well as political assets. Although Venetian rule had 
always been viewed . mewhat negatively by the indigenous peoples of the 
Dalmatian coast, the Republic had many strong links with the towns it had 
lost. Many Venetians had held key government posts in the administrations 
of the towns, and Dalmatian merchants had traded extensively with 
businessmen in Venice. This political and commercial contact, however, also 
had caused some ill-feelings. For example, the Dalmatians were not always 
happy to have Venetians exerting a strong influence in their domestic 
decision-making process. In addition, the Dalmatians had been angered when 
the Venetians insisted that they be allowed to use port facilities in the 
Dalmatian coastal towns free of charge. Finally, the Dalmatians did not like 
the inflexibility of having to bring, at least according to the law, all of their 
goods to Venetian markets before offering them at any other towns. This 
Venetian insistence on staple-rights over Dalmatia therefore caused friction 
between the two regions. This ill-will may help to explain why many of the 
Dalmatian towns fell so quickly to the Hungarian invaders. The Dalmations 
did not feel enduring loyalty to the Republic, and would not fight on its 
behalf.
This military struggle with Hungary taught Venice a valuable lesson. 
This experience was instructional because it had shown Venice that expansion 
onto the terra firma would have dangers as well as rewards. Although
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Venice could certainly gain by expanding on the mainland, greedy rivals 
would challenge the Republic to defend its territories. Now that Hungary had 
beer, successful, Venice could expect that other nations would be more willing 
to challenge the Republic. The future therefore promised additional foreign 
policy challenges for the city.
Lorenzo Cclsi and an Eventual Uprising at Crete
Doge Dolfin died during the summer of 1361, and the Republic elected 
Lorenzo Celsi as his successor. The new Doge, a man of a relatively 
undistinguished family, took over during late August of 1361. Like Dolfin, 
when Celsi was elected he was outside of the city, serving in this case as the 
newly appointed Captain of the G u l f . T h i s  fact illustrates the importance 
Venice placed on foreign military and diplomatic service. The Republic was 
not blessed with a huge supply of natural resources like many nation-states 
of modem times. Instead, Venice remained strong and survived numerous 
political and economic challenges because it was able to maintain a strong 
commercial and political position. This power was an outgrowth of the 
activit s of many people within the Republic, but the foreign traders, 
seamen, and diplomats all played a critical role in helping to keep Venice 
strong and free.
Several minor foreign developments occurred during Doge Celsi’s term of 
office. First, the Republic made peace with Duke Rudolf of Austria after the 
Duke had imprisoned two Venetian ambassadors who had gone on a 
diplomatic mission to Austria.^ These men were apprehended in retaliation 
for Venice's damaging of one of the Austrian ruler's homes during the
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Republic's struggle with Hungary. In addition, Venice received the King of 
Cyprus, King Peter during both 1362 and 1364 as a guest of the city. Finally, 
another famous foreign visitor, Petrarch, came to reside in the city during 
Celsi's dogeship. The Venetians invited the famous humanist to live in a 
beautiful home within the city. In return, Petrarch agreed to leave Venice his 
library upon his death.
A more important foreign affairs event which occurred was an uprising 
on the Venetian island of Crete. Interestingly, this uprising was not led, as 
might be expected, by the Greeks who always had lived on the island.
Instead, the revolt principally was instigated by transplanted Venetians, 
some of whom had lived on the island for generations.^ This uprising was 
an outgrowth of many different influences, but the immediate issue which 
ignited the conflict was a customs tax which the Venetians imposed on the 
island.
The underlying causes of discontent, however, went far beyond the 
surface issue of taxation. In reality, more enduring factors caused the 
residents of the island to respond with such a violent reaction. The Venetians 
always had carried out a rather ill-advised policy of excluding local citizens 
from top-level administrative posts, even if the individuals living in the 
colony were of Venetian descent. As a result, none of the former residents of 
Venice who lived in Crete ever were able to influence the resolution of many 
critical problems which affected the lives of those people on the island. In 
addition, many of the Venetian transplants were disdainful because they had 
been excluded from ever being able to join the Great Council. Thus, the issue
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of the imposition of a tax on imports from Venice caused great anger. The 
leaders of the Republic, who were all located in Venice, never asked if the 
people of Crete supported or approved of such a measure Although the 
Venetians claimed that any revenues from the assessments would he used lot 
infrastructure work in the harbors of Crete, the residents of the island III!
took offense at the treatment they received from Venice.
These people of Crete offered a piopnsal which almost cettailtly would 
have been in Venice's long term best Illtelesls to accept I he plan was quite 
modest, and did not call l ot any unreasonable measures on the pat I of the 
Venetians. In fact, all the u : ioet |s of Ihe Island wanted to do was send a 
group of twenty individuals to Venice to voice tlteit complaints to the 
government. Unfortunately, Venice unwisely scoffed at this modest demand. 
Instead the Venetians told ll|e Cleletts that the taxes would he assessed and 
collected regardless of any objections of those people who lived on the island. 
The Venetians regarded the requests of the local residents as utterly 
unjustified.
This response pushed the Crelcns to open rebellion. The island 
temporarily threw off the yoke of Venetian rule, and prepared |o fight 
against any Venetian attempts to repress the uprising, In responding to this 
insurrection, the Venetians severely underestimated the strength of the 
rebels' fury, and took a course of action which was clearly inadequate. The 
leaders of the Republic sent two delegations of officials to the island to 
explain the position of the Great Council, confident that the presence of 
representatives from Venice would cause the people of Crete to realize the
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error of the actions. These emissaries, however, hardly placated the residents 
of the island. In fact, both groups of Venetian officials were forced to flee 
from Crete in fear of their lives.
Upon return of the second group of unsuccessful diplomats, the Venetians 
responded with more decisive action. They hired a leading mercenary 
military commander, a position known as a condotierre, and ordered him to 
suppress the rebellion, This commander, Luchino dal Verme, was given a 
fleet to carry his force of some twenty-five hundred men, including one 
thousand mounted soldiers, ^  In addition, the Republic worked on the 
diplomatic front, sending emissaries to the other major powers of Europe to 
ask them to refuse to give any assistance to the Crcten revolutionaries.
These responses were sufficient to regain control of the island; however, 
the incident hurt Venice on a long-term basis in several ways. The 
condotticve Commander dal Verme, and the liuops cost a great deal of money, 
funds which were becoming increasingly scarce in the Republic's treasuries. 
Likewise, the underlying tensions which precipitated the incident still 
remained unresolved, t Vnainly, some of she people who helped lead the 
revolt may have tceonsidcied their decision., concluding they would be better 
off under Venetian control than H\ mg on an island ruled by Greeks. Other 
residents on the island, though, still were incensed that they could not taki 
part in the Circa* Council. In addition, lingering resentment would persist 
because many of the leaders of the uprising were hi ought to trial and 
executed as traitors. The families of these men were naturally resentful of 
these u nuns, and support for the Venetians remained thin despite any
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control that was maintained over the island. The Greeks on Crete ven 
less contented, and minor guerrilla activity persisted lor several ye 
following the reconquest of the island.
The Brief Reign of Marco Corner 
The time of the repression of the rebellion on Crete also marked the 
death of Doge Celsi. Once again, the Republic elected a man as Doge who had 
given his nation many years of loyal foreign service. This leader was Marco 
Corner, a venerable individual who was well over seventy live years old at 
the time of his selection. The new Doge was a somewhat controversial choice 
in that he was not of the typical lineage to ascend to the highest office in 
Venice. Corner was rather poor, and he had married a woman of an 
undistinguished common family.^ Despite these atypical characteristics, 
however, Corner was selected by the leaders of the Republic and ascended to 
the dogeship during July of 1365.
Doge Corner did not rule for very long, and foreign affairs during his 
tenure were rather quiet. For example, none of the Venetian colonies erupted 
as Crete had previously. The Venetians also refused to join into a military 
alliance that was planning a crusade against the Soldan of Turkey. The 
Republic was having enough trouble securing her own possessions to start 
trouble overseas, so it was not eager to commit any forces in a faraway war. 
Commercially, Doge Corner's reign w:.s highlighted by increased foreign trade 
with the merchants of Alexandria. The. Venetians had not traded with the 
Muslims for some time due to religious pressure, but during Corner's reign 
the Pope gave his approval for renewed commercial contacts. Overall, Venice
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in this time period tried to recover after her losses to King Lajos of Hungary. 
The Republic was reluctant to take risks, and tried to focus its energies on 
improving its economy. Doge Corner’s short and uneventful reign ended with 
his death on January 13, 1368, and his term of office was not marked by any 
major events in foreign affairs.
!£hfe.Re i^miig.-Qfilig Contarini Doge ship
Venice elected another elderly man to succeed Corner. This leader, 
Andrea Contarini, was actually retired when he was chosen to occupy the 
highest office in the Republic. In fact, when told of his selection, Contarini 
refused the offer and needed to be coaxed and threatened in order to accept 
the nomination. During the next fourteen years of Contarini's term of office, 
the Republic was faced with many political and military crises hoth at home 
and abroad. Doge Contarini was leader of Venice during one of the most 
critical periods in the history of the nation.
The first challenge which faced Contarini, however, was not a major 
problem. The Venetians were forced to put down a rebellion in the normally 
quiet city of Trieste, a community which sits at north end of the Adriatic Sea, 
approximately twenty miles east of Aquileia.^ Although Venice was 
confident that it could put down the uprising, it took no delay in responding 
as it had with Crete. Problems with the previous uprising had proven how 
dangerous it could be to wait during an insurrection, so Venice quickly sent 
an armada of galleys to the area to regain control. These ships put the city 
under siege, and were determined to maintain their blockade until the people 
of Trieste surrendered.
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This plan was complicated, however, by the efforts of the Duke of 
Austria, who responded to a Triestan plea for assistance by sending soldiers 
to help the revolutionaries. This action enraged the Venetians, who knew 
that they needed to win the contest with the rebellious city in order to 
prevent further uprisings within their territories. As a result, the Republic 
was determined to suppress the insurrection regardless of any foreign 
assistance promised to the people of Trieste. In addition, the Venetians 
wanted to punish the Austrians for aiding Trieste in order to discourage 
future meddling by hungry neighbors such as Hungary or Aquilcia. As a 
result, the Venetians launched a two-front offensive against the Tricstans and 
Austrians. They reinforced their naval blockade while also attacking their 
enemies on land. In this action on the terra firma, the Venetian army 
attacked the combined Tricstan/Austrian forces and won a convincing 
victory. Following this setback, the Austrian troops pulled back and left the 
Tricstans to continue the fight on their own. Without the support of the 
Austrian troops, however, the city soon fell to the Venetian forces. By the 
beginning of December, 1369, Trieste surrendered and once again came under 
firm control of the Republic.
Although this uprising in Trieste might not have been as critical as 
battles fought over other larger or more strategically important towns, 
success there was very important in terms of Venice's reputation and 
prestige. Residents in the Republic could well remember recent foreign 
affairs problems, and this victory helped to restore Venetian confidence. In 
addition, the Venetian military triumph over the Austrians signaled the fact
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that Venice would not tolerate outside interference in its territories. As such, 
the Triestan rebellion was an important foreign affairs triumph.
The second foreign policy crisis which occurred during Doge Contarini's 
term was precipitated by a direct threat to Venetian commercial prosperity.
In Padua, the local government had begun building a salt production facility. 
This action was interpreted as an affront to Venetian staple control and 
century-old monopoly in salt production and distribution in the region. This 
salt trade was of critical importance to the Venetians, and as a result, they 
once again decisively acted to assert their power. The Venetians sent a 
diplomatic delegation to the leader of Padua, Francesco da Carrara. This 
group expressed the Venetians' contempt for the Paduan construction efforts, 
and also stated that the Republic would act to stop any salt production if the 
Paduans did not do so voluntarily.
This act of defiance was not the first time the Venetians had experienced 
problems with Padua, and the Republic had been growing increasingly 
suspicious of Paduan loyalty for several years. Back in 1356, Lord Francesco 
da Carrara had seriously considered breaking his tics with Venice and joining 
King Lajos of Hungary when the invader was advancing on the Republic.
The Paduans naturally resented the Venetian influence within their city, and 
they ideally wanted to regain their autonomy if a favorable opportunity 
presented itself. As a result of their animosity, the Paduans did not 
immediately accede to the Venetian demands to halt the construction of the 
salt facility. In fact, The Duke of Padua called on his friend, King Lajos of 
Hungary, and asked for diplomatic and military support.
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The King offered to help out in diplomatic negotiations between Padua 
and Venice, but he would not commit any troops to the Paduan cause. The 
Paduans accepted this offer, and Hungary began acting as a facilitator in joint 
talks between the discontented cities. These negotiations were started in 
hopes of finding a peaceful solution to the problem, however the talks 
produced nothing because neither side would back down. The Venetians 
simply would not tolerate any salt production that would endanger their 
monopoly in the industry, and Padua would not agree to stop its plans to 
build and operate the new facility. The negotiations soon ended in defeat, 
and the two cities prepared to escalate the disagreement into a military 
confrontation.
Venice once again was determined to crush this affront to its authority. 
The city contracted for the services of the condottiere Renier del Gauschi to 
lead its troops, and quickly attacked the city of Padua. Venetian troops 
ravaged Paduan lands and attacked Duke Carrara's possessions throughout 
the area. The Venetians also besieged the city, determined to force the 
Paduans to capitulate. With their troops encircling Padua, the Venetians 
became confident that they would once again suppress a rebellion at a 
neighboring city. The Duke of Padua, however, was working to attack the 
Republic on another front. Carrara had begun to try to act upon a scheme to 
assassinate several leaders of the Republic with the help of two traitorous 
members of the Senate.®1* This plot was discovered, and news of the 
murderous plans caused a great deal of both fear and anger within Venice. 
Both the nobles and common people within the Republic panicked, and
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rumors abounded about other treacherous Paduan plans.
As a result, the Venetians gave out harsh punishments to all people 
implicated in the assassination plan. The two nobles who were plotting with 
Carrara were both given harsh sentences, with one being beheaded and the 
other imprisoned for ten years.®*' The two assassins which had agreed to 
work for the nobles both were publicly drawn and quartered.
The Venetian siege did not produce fast results, as is typical with this 
type of military tactic. Padua was determined to resist the Venetian soldiers, 
and the rebels were aided by mercenaries as well as troops given by King 
Lajos of Hungary. The Venetian siege was taking its toll, but the combined 
Paduan forces also were winning some victories. After the Paduans and 
Hungarians defeated Venice at both Narvesa and Fossanova, the Venetians 
concluded that the time had come for them to launch a more aggressive 
assault against the rebellious town.
The Venetians attacked the Hungarians and Paduans while they were 
laying siege to a small Venetian fortress. The Hungarian/Paduan forces were 
taken by surprise, and the Venetians won a major victory in the encounter.
The Venetians dominated the military battle, and captured many of their 
enemies. Included in those taken prisoner was a man named Stephen of 
Transylvania, leader of the Paduan mercenaries and nephew of King La jo s .^  
Once the Venetians realized that they had captured the King's relative, they 
decided to use this resource to force an advantageous peace settlement. They 
brought the Transylvanian back to Venice, and contacted the King of Hungary 
to begin negotiations over Stephen. The Venetians offered to return the
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Prince on the condition that the Hungarians would withdraw all support for 
the Paduan rebels. Although the King would have liked to keep aiding 
Carrara, the Hungarian accepted this proposal and regained his nephew. All 
Hungarian troops returned home, leaving Franesco da Carrara alone to 
continue his fight against Venice.
The Paduans had hoped to liberate themselves form Venetian 
domination, but without foreign assistance their efforts were doomed.
Carrara knew he could not fight he Venetians without outside help, so he was 
forced to surrender. A peace settlement was signed between the two powers 
on September 22, 1387.^ Venice once again had defeated a rebellious 
possession and the leaders of the Republic were determined to punish Padua 
for its impropriety. The Venetians razed all of Carrara's military 
fortifications, and required the Paduan to pay a fine of 250,000 ducats. 
Carrara's son was forced to go before the Venetian Senate and apologize, 
pledging the future support and allegiance of the defeated city. Thus, Venice 
had emerged strong from her second foreign affairs crisis during the dogeship 
of Andrea Contarini. The Republic had now twice shown other powers that 
Venice was willing to fight to remain in control of its possessions. Other 
forces could try to help any rebellious cities, but they did so at risk. The 
Venetians would attack any foe and persist until they had suppressed 
rebellions within their lands.
Prelude to the Fourth Genoese War
Venice continued to demonstrate this resolve thioughout the 1370s. This 
decade marked one of the most important events in the history of Venetian
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foreign affairs: (lie Fourth Genoese War. This war marked the resumption of 
Venice's age-old struggle with her commercial and political rival on the 
Ligurian coast.
The principal cause of the war between Venice and Genoa was, as always, 
the ciders' commercial rivalry in the rich ports of the Hast. During the years 
following the Third Genoese War, the Republic had continued to maintain and 
improve its foreign commercial contacts. The galleys of Venice had always 
controlled the Adriatic, protecting Venetian commercial vessels and harassing 
any other vessels which tried to erode the Venetian trade monopoly in the 
region. In addition, Venetian diplomats and merchants worked to open new 
routes for commercial trade outside of the Adriatic. For example, the 
Venetians made sure to preserve their access to trade routes to the north.
Using their supply paths, the Venetians traveled overland through Germany, 
Switzerland, and France.™ The Venetians also made voyages through the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic. Using these routes, Venice was able to trade 
with the ports of England as well as with the rich commercial towns of Bruges 
in Flanders. Likewise, Venetian galleys also journeyed southward to 
Alexandria and also to Levantine ports in the Holy Land. Similarly, Venice 
was able to ship and receive goods from India and Persia through her 
commercial posts in Syria and Egypt.
All of this trade allowed Venice to remain a major world power, despite 
her relatively small size and population. The Republic had always derived its 
strength from its maritime talents and commercial abilities, and these 
attributes allowed the city to exert its influence far beyond the confines of
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the lagoons of Venice. This activity also brought the city great riches. 
Venice's position as a middle-man in the East West trade guaranteed her 
profits regardless of the market conditions for any products or commodities. 
By transporting wares across the Mediterranean, the Republic was able to 
amass tremendous wealth. This wealth, however, also created great jealousy 
and animosity from other cities, most notably Genoa. The two powers were 
constantly at odds, engaged in a rivalry that often led to violent clashes. Over 
the years, this Genoan/Vcnetian animosity often produced full-scale 
hostilities. This happened once again in the 1370s.
In 1372, the two cities clashed as a result of an incident concerning King 
Peter of Cyprus and Jerusalem. When Peter was crowned in Famagusta 
during October, Venetian and Genoan representatives at the ceremony broke 
into a quarrel over matters of protocol. As the arguments escalated, several 
Gcnoans drew weapons and threatened the Venetians, despite the fact that 
carrying swords was expressly forbidden by local law.^^ Although some of 
the Venetians also must have been armed, the Gcnoans were the only ones 
accused of criminal action, doubtless because of the Famagustans' animosity 
towards Genoa.
The charged officials were arrested and stripped of their weapons, 
creating a public outcry within Genoa. The Gcnoans naturally were upset that 
their diplomats had been treated as criminals, and felt that their 
representatives had suffered from a discriminatory application of justice. In 
addition, the Gcnoans wanted to insure that Venice was not gaining control of 
Cyprus, a development which would seriously harm Genoan commerce in the
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Hast. As a result, the Germans decided to attack the city of Famagusta. They 
sent fleets against the city, and their armada had great success. Famagusta 
fell on October 6, 1373, and the Genoans continued their offensive until they 
had gained control of the entire island of Cyprus. The citizens of Famagusta 
surrendered to the Genoans, and were forced to agree to a harsh peace 
settlement. Famagusta was required to give Genoa a onetime reparations 
payment of 2,(XX),(X)0 florins, and the fallen city also agreed to pay an annual 
indemnity of 40,OCX) florins. In addition, the Genoans took hostages to 
discourage any retaliatory actions. Several of King Peter's relatives and 
approximately sixty members of the city's nobility were taken back to Genoa. 
Finally, the conquerors kept control cf the city of Famagusta, but returned the 
rest of Cyprus to the defeated King Petcr.^
This turnover in influence in Cyprus did not end Venetian-Genoan contact 
on the island. Venetians continued to live on the island, and many owned 
property and real estate. The Genoese did not persecute citizens of the 
Republic, but Venetian commercial activities in the region of course suffered 
under Genoan rule. Since the two cities both wanted to control Cyprus and 
other trade centers of the Fast, they continually would be drawn into conflict.
War did not immediately break out over any developments in Cyprus, 
however, as both Venice and Genoa both became occupied with foreign 
problems in Constantinople. This crisis was precipitated by huge debts that 
the Emperor of Constantinople, John V Paleologus, owed to the Venetian 
Repub l i c . The  Emperor had incurred these debts in previous years funding 
unsuccessful attempts to resist Turkish attacks on his lands. At that itme,
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Adrianople as well as large portions of Thrace had fallen to the infidels, and 
John was no longer able to protect his possessions. As a result, the Emperor 
had traveled across liuropc asking for military and monetary assistance. I Ic 
received some limited support, but the citizens of Venice imprisoned him 
when he came to the Republic because he owed so much money to the city. 
The limperor was able to win his release, but he left Venice with a huge debt 
burden. Venice generously promised not to invade to recover the debt for a 
period of five years, and the Emperor assured the Republic that he would 
begin to repay Venice.
This five year period ended, however, and the Limperor still owed a great 
deal of money. Therefore, Venice took action to recover the funds. The 
leaders of the Republic sent a diplomatic commission to Constantinople in 
1375, but this group had no success. Upon the return of the committee, the 
Venetians decided to respond with stronger force. They sent an armada to 
Constantinople in the Spring of 1376, and the Venetians threatened to begin 
waging a war against the limperor unless he accepted a Venetian peace 
proposal. This offer required the limperor to repay all monies he owed the 
Republic, and also required him to let Venice occupy the island of Tenedos.
In return, the Venetians would not attack and would also give the Emperor 
some money and jewels which had been confiscated. The Emperor really had 
no choice but to accept; he couldn't defeat the Venetian armada and did not 
want to lose control of his empire.
The Venetians were pleased that the Emperor agreed to accept their 
proposal. Of course, they wanted their money back, and were happy that
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they could finally collect overdue payments. More importantly however, the 
Republic was satisfied because it had gained control of the strategically 
critical island of Tcnedos. With Genoa effectively controlling Cyprus, it was 
vital for Venice to maintain a viable position at the mouth of the Sea of 
Marmara, a region which always always been of great importance both to 
Venice and Genoa. Occupying Tcnedos provided a way to protect Venetian 
interests in this region.
In addition, many problems centered around activity in this area near 
the Sea of Azov and Black Sea, Both Venice and Genoa had always tried to 
dominate trade with Constantinople, and the cities also tried to control the 
island of Tenedos. By gaining control of this port, Venice could potentially 
block access to the Black Sea and choke off Gcnoan access lines. Realizing this 
fact, the Genoans became frightened by the Venetian acquisition of Tenedos.
In fact, the Germans decided to fight to keep the Venetians from occupying 
the island, a decision which led to the start of the Fourth Genoese War.
Venetian possession of the island did not occur without a challenge, and this 
challenge escalated into full-scale hostilities between the two powers.
The Emperor is Overthrown
When the Genoans heard about John’s agreement with Venice, they 
worked to try to avoid losing the island. If Genoa could occupy the island, it 
would dominate the region with its new acquisitions of Tenedos and Cyprus. 
The Genoan plan to try to gain control of the island required the overthrow of 
Emperor John V PalcoJogus, which the Genoans effected with relatively little
88
opposition during the summer of 1376.93 The citizens of Constantinople did 
not resist this Gcnoan action because they were not happy with the Emperor. 
Me had angered them by recognizing the authority of the Pope during his 
journey through Europe, and the Eastern Orthodox people of Constantinople 
regarded this act as heresy. In addition, the residents of the city were not 
pleased that John had lost control of Tenedos,
As a result, the Gcnoans tried to take control of the island. They 
convinced the new Emperor, John's son Andronicus, to turn Tcncdos over to 
the Genoans. Working from their possessions of Pera and Galata, the Gcnoans 
made an attempt to conuer the territory in 1376. Unfortunately for the 
Genoans, however, their plans were thwarted by the residents of the island 
when the local Greeks stopped the Genoan advance. The Greeks were 
determined to resist any Genoan effort to occupy Tenedos, and appealed tc 
Venice for assistance. The Venetians sent troops to the Greeks, and the forces 
happily were welcomed as protectors of the island.
This action led to open warfare. Following the arrival of the Venetians, 
the Genoans threatened Emperor Andronicus and told him to regain control of 
his possession and then turn it over to Genoa. The new ruler tried to comply 
with this order, but he could not impose his will on the local residents or the 
Venetian soldiers occupying Tenedos. Frustrated, and looking for an outlet to 
use to exert pressure against the Republic, the Emperor imprisoned all of the 
Venetians within Constantinople.^ Venice immediately sent a diplomatic 
committee to protest this act and demand the release of the Venetians This 
request was refused. Both Venice and Genoa were unhappy with the
89
situation in Constantinople, and each side began preparing for war.
The Republic immediately dispatched a fleet of galleys to insist on the 
safe return of all Venetians. If this appeal was denied, the ships were 
ordered to attack the city and overthrow Emperor Andronicus. The Venetians 
did not even believe Andronicus was the legitimate ruler of the Empire, and 
were going to replace him with his imprisoned father John. This armada, 
however, never had a chance to take control of Constantinople. Instead, the 
galleys were needed to intercept a force of Genoan galleys which were 
supposed to attack the Venetian-occupied island of Tcncdos. The Genoans 
were going to receive assistance in this campaign from Emperor Andronicus, 
who also was sending a squadron of ships. Thus, the arguments over Tcncdos 
had escalated into the Fourth Genoese War.
The Republic Pushed to the Brink of Disaster
This war pushed the Republic to the limits of its military, political, and 
economic endurance. Before the conclusion of the hostilities, Venice would 
face attacks against combined forces from many of her longtime enemies, 
including Genoa, Padua, Hungary, Austria, and Aquileia.-^ Each of these 
powers had reasons which motivated them to try to topple the Venetian 
Republic, and they all fought vigorously in an attempt to destroy their 
adversary. For example, the Carraresi had begun to exert a considerably 
more autocratic rule over Padua, and they wanted, as before, to eliminate the 
Venetian influence in their internal affairs. In addition, the Paduans also 
harbored aspirations of making their own expansion on the terra firma, and 
they were more than willing to fight if they saw a chance to seize some of
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Venice's mainland possessions. Likewise, the Hungarians were rivals of 
Venice on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, and they hoped to weaken 
Venetian commercial power in the region. Aquileia also hoped to weaken the 
commercial strength of the Republic because Aquileian merchants could not 
compete with Venice. Finally, Austria hoped to extend its influence down 
through the Alps into the fertile Italian farmlands south of the mountains.
Venice realized that her enemies would form a coalition, so it also forged 
alliances with other powers. Per example, Venice was able to enlist the 
assistance of Cyprus. The Cypriote leaders were eager to take revenge on the 
Genoans after their unsuccessful attempt to gain control of the island. As a 
result, King Peter of Cyprus led his people into a mutual assistance pact with 
the Republic.
The Venetians also were able to gain the support of a longtime rival, the 
Visconti of Milan. The leader of Milan, Barnabo' Visconti, was the father of 
King Pete of Cyprus's fiance, Valentina Visconti. As a result, the Milanese 
also were willing to help Venice--for a price. Visconti agreed to assist Venice, 
but any mainland territories that were conquered would become the property 
of Milan. Venice, however, would remain in control of any maritime 
acquisitions. Venice, Milan, and Cyprus thus agreed to join efforts in 
November of 1377.™ This coalition, as well as the alliance which opposed it, 
had considerable resources and manpower, and the battles promised to be 
hard-fought and dangerous.
VenL'' undertook considerable efforts to muster a formidable military 
force from within the Republic. The customary system of drafting men by
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lots was used, and three men out of each draft group of twelve were asked to 
take up arms for the city. This ratio was high and reflects Venetian resolve to 
emerge victorious in the battle. The city also created special committees 
within the government to oversee military affairs, and collected public funds 
to help fund the campaign. This money was used to hire mercenaries and 
condotticri and also was used to set up defenses within the Republic.
After hastily completing preparations, Venice plunged into the conflict. 
The city was fortunate to be led by Doge Contarini, a wise and able leader 
whose talents proved invaluable during the course of the war. The Doge was 
popular with his people, and had earned many years of experience serving 
his state. Venice also was led by her commander of the sea, Vettor Pisani, 
nephew of Niccolo' Pisani, Venetian commander at Portolungo. Pisani had 
distinguished himself in other naval commands, and he previously served in 
the office of Captain of the G ulf.^ In this capacity, Pisani coordinated all 
Venetian naval activities in the North Adriatic, keeping out pirates and 
protecting all Venetian shipping.
Pisani’s greatest strength, however, was not his naval expertise; the 
commander was a zealot patriot, and he had the ability to command the 
respect and admiration of the entire Republic. Both his sailors and the 
general populace rallied around Pisani, forgiving his family for any disgrace 
his uncle had caused after the failure at Portolungo. In addition, Pisani was 
popular in spite of an incident which had occurred in the period between the 
Third and Fourth Genoese Wars. At that time, Pisani had a violent outburst in 
which he attacked another Venetian nobleman, Pietro Corner, after Comer
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had questioned his honor. An official on one of the ships in the Venetian fleet 
was accused of violating a law against loading goods on a ship without 
permission of the fleet commander. Pisani testified that the ship worker had 
received approval from the commander (himself), but Corner challenged the 
veracity of his testimony. This affront enraged Pisani, who told Corner that 
he had better carry arms to defend himself when Pisani came to avenge his 
honor. Pisani proceeded to find Corner and come after him with a knife. 
Corner escaped, 'nd pressed charges against Pisani. The assailant was 
convicted, fined, and deprived of his elected office. The Venetians never held 
this crime against Pisani, and the commander led the Republic into battle as 
he received the banner of St. Mark from the Doge in April of 1378.
Venice also was led by Carlo Zeno, a Venetian admiral in the war. Like 
Pisani, Zeno too had a violent temper, challenging a knight to a duel during his 
young adulthood when he was studying for the priesthood. This incident led 
Zeno to decide that he should not pursue a career within the church, and he 
returned to the laity to spend his life as a merchant and soldier. Zeno had 
been involved in a series of flamboyant episodes throughout his life, many of 
which doubtless were glorified since his death. Regardless, Admiral Zeno was 
a naval genius who relished a military challenge.
Both Zeno, Pisani, and Contarini would face many challenges over the 
course of the Fourth Genoese War. Less than six weeks into the conflict, 
Pisani led a Venetian fleet of some fifteen galleys into a battle with a Genoan 
armada led by Luigi de’ Fieschi. These fleets met off the coast of Anzio near 
the mouth of the Tiber River.^8 This clash occurred during very a violent
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storm, and four of the Venetian galleys could not even maneuver into the 
fight because of the rough.seas. Despite this problem, the Venetians still got 
the best of the fighting. The galleys of the Republic were able to capture five 
Genoan ships, and also destroyed another enemy vessel by forcing it into the 
rocks.^
This Genoan defeat caused a internal panic within Genoa. As had 
happened in the past during struggles between the enemies, Genoa reacted to 
a military defeat with harsh actions, redoubling its efforts. The city removed 
their leader, Doge Campofrcgoso, from office and replaced him with a new 
officer, Doge Guercio. This new Doge led a Genoan effort to reassemble his 
city's fleet, and the Genoans had another armada in the seas by winter.
Meanwhile, the Venetians chose not to follow up and try to inflict further 
damages on their enemy. Pisani did not have a large flotilla, and as the seas 
proved at Anzio, the unseasonable weather was making it difficult to 
coordinate any military efforts. As a result, Pisani led his galleys eastward, 
journeying to Cyprus and undertaking an effort to harass Genoan commerce 
in the Levant. On the way home from this journey, Pisani was able to gain 
control of both Cattaro and Sebenico, two cities located on the shores of the 
Adriatic. The Venetians also were able to meet up with several allied galleys 
which were coming from ports in the Aegean. The Commander then spent a 
short period of time patrolling the Adriatic trying to maintain complete 
Venetian control of the area. After all of these activities were concluded, 
Pisani made plans to return to the lagoons for the remainder of the winter, 
where he could make any necessary repairs on his ships, rest his men, and
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pick up supplies. As was necessary, Pisani asked the Senate for permission to 
bring It is fleet back home into Venice.
The Venetian rulers received the commander's request, but they would 
not accede to iiis petition. Instead, the Senate ordered Pisani to spend the 
winter at the town of Pola, located across the Adriatic in Istria, approximately 
due cast of Ravenna. ^  The Venetians wanted their armada at this location 
because they wanted the fleet to be in a position where it could most 
effectively defend Venetian commercial convoys. The Senate believed that 
this Istrian outpost would offer the best opportunity to achieve this goal.
Albeit reluctantly, Pisani sailed to Pola as ordered and prepared for the 
winter.
Pisani was rightfully angry at the Senate for keeping him away from 
Venice for the winter. He had fought brilliantly in service of the state, but he 
had been away from the city since April and his troops were tired. Wintering 
at Pola meant an additional extended period away from home and family for 
his entire fleet. In addition, it would be difficult to adequately repair ships in 
Pola, far away from the facilities and workmen of the Arsenal. The 
Commander protested, sending another request back to the Senate asking for 
permission to return home. As before, this appeal was denied.
Battle at Pola
As a result, Venice's fleet spent the winter in Istria. This refusal to let 
the armada return to the lagoons proved to be a great mistake, as the fleet 
was to suffer a shattering defeat at their station in Pola during May of 1379. 
Prior to this engagement, Pisani had been trying to reassemble his ships and
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prepare to restore his fleet to battle condition. Although the Commander had 
directed efforts to protect a group of commercial grain ships which had sailed 
from Apulia, the Venetian fleet was hardly ready to engage in a major 
confrontation."" Many men had taken ill during the months at Pola, and 
some ships were still in need of repairs. As a consequence, Pisani knew he 
was in trouble when he saw the possibility of being drawn into a major clash 
with the Genoans.
To his credit, Pisani tried to avoid entering into the battle which resulted 
in the Venetian defeat, lie knew that his ships and men were not ready to 
engage their adversaries, and he wanted to avoid a confrontation until he was 
adequately prepared. Unfortunately, Pisani was unsuccessful iti keeping his 
men out of combat. On May 7, 1379, an armada of Genoan ships appeared 
outside of the harbor of Pola. Only part of this fleet was visible, and the 
Venetians saw a group of sixteen enemy ships inviting them to battle. The 
Genoans, however, had hidden a force of six galleys outside of view of the 
V e n e t ia n s . j h e ships were to be used to storm the flank of the Venetians 
in surprise if the Genoans could lure their enemy out into battle.
Despite the fact that the Venetians had approximately twenty-five ships, 
Pisani wanted to avoid a battle at this time. Some of his ships were filled 
with supplies, and would be difficult to maneuver them in a confrontation. In 
addition, the fleet was ill-prepared to meet such a formidable opponent 
because many ships were not in prime fighting condition. Finally, Carlo Zeno 
was supposed to join this fleet soon on the way home from a tour of duty in 
the Levant. Pisani wanted to wait until Zeno arrived, when the Venetians
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would have a far greater chance of defeating their enemy. The Commander 
called a meeting to discuss the Venetian response to the Gcnoan call to arms, 
and at this council he recommended that the ships ignore the Gcnoan 
challenge and remain within the protection of the harbor.
Unfortunately, this advice was ignored. His captains, as well as additional 
Senate officials known as proveditors who were sent from Venice to help 
coordinate naval actions, interpreted the commander's advice as cowardice. 
They all insisted that the Venetians immediately engage in battle. The group 
pushing for a fight reasoned that since these same men and ships had crushed 
the Genoans at Anzio, they would do so again here at Pola. In the end, Pisani 
was forced to back down from his position. The Venetians prepared for battle 
in all possible haste, confident they would once again defeat the Genoans.
This engagement proved to be a debacle for the Republic. Ironically, at 
first, it seemed as if the Venetians would indeed win another victory. The 
fleet rushed the Genoans, and Pisani led the charge on the enemy. The 
Gcnoan admiral's galley was captured, and the Venetians even killed the 
enemy commander, Luciano D o ria .^  T|le Venetians were fighting valiantly, 
and Genoans began to pull back into retreat.
This retreat, however, drew the Venetians directly into the Gcnoan trap. 
The Venetians eagerly pursued their foes, only to be ambushed by the 
Gcnoan galleys which were hidden away from the main fleet. The Genoans 
proceeded to utterly rout the Venetians, and only six ships of the Republic 
escaped capture or destruction. Thousands of men were taken prisoner, and 
several hundred were killed in the battle. Led by their commander, Vettor
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Pisani, the six surviving Venetian ships fled from Pola and took refuge in the 
port of Parenzo. * ^
After news of this fiasco reached the lagoons, the Venetian leaders 
summoned Pisani back home and put him on trial for his actions. The 
commander was not accused of being a traitor or a coward, but lie was 
instead charged with negligence in the line of duty. The leaders of the 
Republic held Pisani responsible because they believed that he did not 
adequately insure that watchmen were performing their duty. Pisani also 
was convicted of leading his galleys out of the battle after the Venetians had 
begun to suffer losses. This tactic may have been prudent strategically, but u 
was considered a criminal offense under the dictates of Venetian military law. 
The commander was convicted on both charges, removed from office, and 
sentenced to a six month term in prison. In addition, Pisani was prohibited 
from holding any other office for an additional five years. Many nobles 
wanted to issue a harsher punishment, but they were hesitant to give a 
tougher sentence because Pisani was so adored by the people of the Republic.
All of Venice was despondent over the crushing defeat of the city's fleet. 
Aside from the six battered ships in dock at Parenzo, the Republic had no 
galleys to use to defend the city. Carlo Zeno also was leading a second 
Venetian fleet, but he was off attacking Gcnoan shipping. The Venetian 
commander was expected to return shortly, but the Genoans could attack the 
unprotected city at any moment. Luckily for Venice, their enemy had lost its 
commander during the battle, and therefore the Genoans needed a short 
period of time to regroup after the engagement. The Venetians knew,
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however, that they would be called on to fight for the survival of their state 
as soon as Genoa rearmed for an attack.
A Gcnoan Push at the Republic
Doge Contarini valiantly led the efforts to protect the city from the 
expected Gcnoan assault. The people of the city realized that the very 
existence of the city was at stake, and they frantically prepared to meet the 
Gcnoan attack. Rich commoners as well as noblemen gave huge sums of 
money in support of the defensive efforts. ^  These funds were used for a 
variety of purposes including outfitting galleys, hiring mercenaries, and 
building fortifications. In setting up defenses, the Venetians tried to block off 
all of the entrances to the city. They sunk ships to barricade the entrance to 
the Lido port, and set up sentinels to watch for the arrival of the Gcnoan fleet. 
They also pulled up all of the wooden piles which were used to help boatmen 
navigate in the shallow and dangerous waters within the lagoons. In previous 
wars, the Venetians had drafted soldiers from the corps of eligible men. This 
time, however, virtually every heathy resident was enlisted in the defense of 
the city.
The Venetian military prepared to meet its foe, and soldiers took 
positions around the city. At sea, the six ships which had survived the defeat 
at Pola were put under the command of Carlo Zeno's father-in-law, Giustiani 
Zeno. The Venetians also hired a condottiere named Giacomo da' Cavalli to try 
to defend the city from aggressions on the terra f l r m a .^  Cavalli was 
leading a force of over six thousand men, including sizeable numbers of 
mounted soldiers and bowmen. These men spread out across the shores of
99
the remaining Venetian territories. Meanwhile, the residents of the city 
patrolled the lagoons, while committees of military advisors sat at the Ducal 
Palace around the clock, ready to coordinate necessary responses if an attack 
occurred. Finally, the Venetians unsuccessfully tried to arm an additional 
sixteen galleys from within the city. Following a general call draft, most of 
the men called refused to report for battle In fact, there were enough 
crewmen for only six ships.
Many Venetians would not report when called because they were 
indignant at the treatment given to Vettor Pisani. The commander was 
immensely popular with the common people of the city, and he was especially 
well-liked by sailors and naval personnel. These individuals did not care that 
Pisani had been defeated at Pola; they were confident of the commander's 
abilities and wanted him to lead them in the effort to defend the Republic.
The seamen believed the defeat was really the fault of the Scnate-thcy had 
refused to let Pisani winter in Venice and repair his ships. As a result, they 
rejected the imprisoned commander's replacement, Taddeo Giustinian. Unless 
Pisani was returned to his position, these men would not fight.
Venice desperately needed these sailors. The Gcnoans viciously had 
attacked on August 7, 1379, confirming the worst fears of the residents of the 
city. The new admiral, Commander Pietro Doria, led a force of approximately 
fifty galleys from his home port, and took a position at Venice near the small 
town of Chioggia.^8 This location was particularly troublesome for the 
Venetians because it potentially allowed Doria to enter the lidi at Chioggia and 
then travel north to Venice. The Genoans also could receive food and supplies
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in this area from the Paduans, former Venetian allies who had joined in the 
effort to destroy the Republic.
Doria came to Chioggia after he had ravaged the Venetian towns of Grado, 
Pellcstrina, and Caorlc. The enemy commander then proceeded to seize 
Chioggia Minor, located just across from Chioggia. In addition, Doria also 
attacked the town of Malumocco, but the residents put up a staunch defense 
and drove the attackers away hum their town. Doria then proceeded towards 
Chioggia where he planned to rendezvous with force of some 25,(XK) soldiers 
which had come up from Padua. These men were not all from that city, but 
instead were from the Kingdom of Hungary as well as the Italian cities on the 
peninsula. Led by the Duke of Padua, these soldiers wc;e allied in a 
combined force which intended to crush Venice once and for all.
Although Chioggia showed no lack of will to resist, its garrison of only 
3,OCX) men could hardly be expected to repel attackers which outnumbered 
them almost ten to one. The Gcnoan forces attacked the city, and the men of 
Chioggia bravely fought to defend their town. Their efforts proved futile, 
however, and the enemy overran Chioggia on August 16, 1379.*'^
The fall of Chioggia presented a very real military problem for the 
Venetians. Chioggia and Venice are connected by a deep water channel that 
gave the Genoans an access route to advance by sea into Venice when they 
chose to attack. In addition, if they chose to delay a direct assault, the 
Genoans could also use their base at Chioggia to help blockade Venice, cutting 
her off from her maritime contacts and supply routes. This was extremely 
important because the Hungarian and Paduan troops already were besieging
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the city on land. With 25,OOO troops, the enemy mainland forces were 
effectively cutting off Venice from the terra firma , slowly strangling the city 
by cutting off all of its supply routes. ^  ^  The Venetians realized that they 
were in grave trouble, and they sent diplomats to try to negotiate a truce.
The Gcnoans, however, refused to even discuss the matter. The cities were 
bitter enemies, and Genoa was determined to crush its rival now that it had 
the opportunity.
The leaders of Venice of course were terrified. If they wanted to fight 
their enemies, they would need to confront a combined force of over 
twenty-five thousand men and the entire Genoan naval fleet. This fleet was 
currently docked within the lagoons, and the Republic had almost no ships of 
her own to use in the defense of the city. When Carlo Zeno returned he would 
be able to help in the naval fight, but he was at sea and it was impossible to 
know when he would come back. Waiting would not be possible, either, as 
the blockade and siege had cut the Republic off from its food supplies and 
commercial contacts. Unless the Venetians could break the blockade, they 
would inevitably fall to their enemies. Finally, the entire situation was 
complicated by the fact that many Venetian seamen would not defend the 
Republic unless Vettor Pisani was released from prison and reinstated as 
leader of the fleet.
Given this scenario, the rulers of the city had no choice but to free Pisani. 
The Venetians had sentenced Pisani to prison, but he was the only man who 
would be able to rally the populace in defense of the city. As a result, Pisani 
was released and allowed to serve once again as a naval officer. The Senate
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tried to keep Pisani in a minor role, initially gaving him a minor post. The 
people would not accept this, however, and forced the leaders of the Republic 
to reinstate Pisani as Admiral. Once Pisani reassumed his former command, 
the seamen of Venice turned out to support the defense of the city. Men who 
had just refused to serve under Taddeo Giustinian eagerly joined to outfit the 
galleys of Pisani’s fleet. The Venetians were able to muster enough men to 
outfit a total of thirty-four warships, and Pisani led a contingent of six of 
these vessels out to defend the southwest entrances to the city. ^   ^*
'I'iie leaders of the Republic also took other extreme steps to help protect 
their territory. They ordered Venetian troops which had fought the Gcnoans 
at Malamocco to abandon their posts and fall back to areas around San Nicolo’ 
and San Giorgio Maggiore. Rich residents also were ordered to help fight the 
food shortage by setting up public kitchens to help feed the poor during the 
siege. In addition, another forced loan was ordered, and the Republic was 
able to gather over six million lire, as well as valuable quantities of precious 
metals and jewels. ^
These funds were used to redouble defensive efforts around the city.
The workers at the Arsenal labored in earnest to assemble a new fleet to 
replace the craft that were destroyed at Pola. The Venetian Arsenal was 
known around the world for its ability to assemble ships quickly, and the 
facility was able to build a force of some forty galleys to use against the 
Genoans. The Venetians also built additional defensive fortifications. They 
put a series of timbers connected by chains across the Grand Canal to hinder 
any assault on the city, and reinforced this barrier with ships and cannon.
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Another wall was built along the Lido, and new fortifications were built on 
the the islands of San Servolo and the Giudecca, and on the terra firma.
Despite these efforts, the Gcnoans would have still been wise to attack 
the city. Venice was still reeling from its loss of Chioggia, and although its 
fleet was quickly being replaced, many of the new crewmen were not 
veterans of the sea. Venice had developed from a strictly maritime city to a 
more balanced economy over the past few centuries, with many men 
conducting their commercial transactions on land and never venturing to sea.
As a result, these sailors did not possess experience rowing or fighting on 
galleys.
Modest Venetian Defensive Successes
The Genoans, however, unwisely hesitated. As the Genoans delayed an 
assault on the Republic, Venice was able to regain its breath and train its 
recruits. The blockade was still slowly weakening the city, but Venice was 
never as vulnerable, either militarily or psychologically, as it was following 
the loss of Chioggia. In the break which the Genoans allowed them, the 
Venetians began to recover. They pushed their enemy back on land, with the 
condottiere Giocomo de' Cavalli leading efforts to break the siege of the city. 
The combined forces of the Republic even moved back into Malamocco and 
maintained control of the city.*
Upon his release from prison, Vettor Pisani combined with Doge Contarini 
to lead the Venetian military efforts. Pisani officially was given the title of 
Chief Executive Officer of the Navy, and Doge Contarini was named Captain 
General of the Sea. Together, these men led Venice through its efforts to
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survive the Genoan blockade.
The Venetians escaped the blockade by pursuing an unusual and 
ingenious course of action-they cut off their enemy's supply lines, isolating 
the Genoans from their provisions and reinforcements. The Venetians carried 
this plan out by sinking ships and barricades into the waters that connected 
Chioggia with the land and sea. In this manner, the Venetians were able to 
trap the large galleys of the Genoans. All of the deep-water passages in the 
area were blocked, but the Venetians could still maneuver about in light craft. 
They were in their home waters and knew how to navigate in the tricky 
waters of the lagoons.
The actions needed to entrap the Genoan vessels were accomplished 
under the cover of darkness on the night of December 22, 1379, the longest 
night of the year.* *  ^ Xhe Venetians landed a force of approximately five 
thousand men at Brondolo, just south of Chioggia. The Genoans quickly 
hurried to push back these soldiers, but in reality this attack was just a 
diversion which allowed the Venetians to carry out their offensive against 
their enemy. While the Genoans were busy repulsing the Venetian land 
assault, Doge Contarini and Pisani led the efforts to blockade the Genoan ships. 
The Venetians sunk the barges and ships into the shallow channels, and 
trapped the Genoan galleys in the lagoons. This was accomplished by 
blocking off the three naval access routes into Chioggia-the port of Chioggia, 
the Lombard Canal, and the Brondolo Channel.* *•’
The Venetians kept the Genoans from removing these obstructions by 
patrolling the area in light sea-craft, keeping constant watch over the area.
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In addition, the Venetians made certain to keep an adequate naval force at 
the northern access points to the lugoons-at the Lido and Malamocco 
harbors-in order to make the blockade complete. In this way, the Venetians 
created an opportunity to fight back against their enemy. Despite this 
blockade, however, the Republic still had grave problems. They were still not 
receiving adequate supplies, and they also were facing the possibility of 
spending the harsh winter trying to continue their blockade from their 
exposed location on the open seas.' ^
The Venetians knew that their blockade would allow them to buy some 
time until Admiral Zeno came back from his raids against Gcnoan shipping. 
They could weaken their enemies at Chioggia, and possibly even get them to 
make a small retreat. This action would make it possible for the Venetians to 
acquire some additional supplies through cither mainland or naval routes.
Zeno Comes Home: Venice Breaks the Blockade 
At this critical time, Venice was helped by the return of its roaming 
naval commander. Zeno appeared on January 1, 1380, none too soon for the 
people of Venice. The city was running out of critical supplies, and many of 
the mercenaries who were helping in the defense of the Republic were 
becoming rebellious. Defending Venice and maintaining the blockade had 
proven to be very dangerous, and many men had been killed or wounded.
With Zeno's arrival, the Venetians knew they must act decisively to break the 
enemy blockade and regain control of the critical access point at Chioggia.
The leaders of the city made plans for Zeno to play a key part in this 
effort. The Commander was dispatched to help defend one of the five
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blockaded entries keeping in the Genoans at Chioggia. Zeno took his eighteen 
ships to help strengthen the blockade at Brondolo, and also was quickly able 
to gain control of one of the former Venetian fortifications: the tower at 
Londo.* *  ^ This acquisition was crucial, for it broke the blockade of the city. 
The Venetians now were able to get reinforcements from their allies in 
Ferrara.
During the fighting to break the blockade, the Venetians killed the 
Gcnoan commander, Pietro Doria. On January 6, 1380, debris from a hit towe 
struck and critically injured the enemy leader, depriving the Genoans of their 
ranking officer in the entire campaign. The Venetians followed up on this 
unexpected event by pushing forward in their efforts to regain control of the 
islands encircling the lagoons. During February, Pisani led a successful effort 
to regain control of the port at Brondolo. This effort allowed the Venetians to 
tighten their grip on their enemy as they kept strengthening the power of 
their counter-blockade of their enemies. With these new Venetian victories, 
the future of the Genoans looked increasingly grim.
During this time period, however, the Venetians still were experiencing 
hardships and defeats. During April of 1380, for example, a Venetian convoy 
which had gone to buy grain at Sicily was intercepted by a Gcnoan 
reinforcement fleet. Under the Command of Marco Maruffo, this armada was 
preying on the Venetian ships which were keeping up the defenses at the 
entrances to the lagoons. * 'Phis fleet also was busy desperately trying to 
engage either Zeno or Pisani in a sea battle. If the Gcnoan could force a 
confrontation and capture or destroy some of the Venetian defense craft, the
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Genoans could break the Venetian blockade of Chioggia and relieve their 
comrades. The Genoans were starving within the Venetian trap, and unless 
they could be unloosed, it would be impossible for them to continue fighting. 
Carrara was trying to send the Genoans grain and other supplies, but Zeno 
was intercepting all of the convoys, '['lie only food available was rats, mice, 
and other vermin J  ^
The Genoans at Chioggia Arc Broken
After many desperate and bloody attempts to break the Venetian 
blockade, the Genoans realized they could endure no more punishment. They 
sent diplomatic representatives to doge Contarini and the Senate, and begged 
the Venetians to allow them to leave. They assured the Venetians that they 
would return home to Genoa, and that they would cause no more trouble for 
the Republic. The Venetians, of course, refused this plea. They had no reason 
to trust their longtime enemy, a foe which had pushed them to the brink of 
destruction and previously had refused Venetian advances to discuss a peace 
settlement. Faced with no other alternatives except starvation, the four 
thousand Genoans and two hundred Paduans trapped at Chioggia 
unconditionally surrendered on June 14, 1380. Admiral Maruffo withdrew as 
well, and he took his fleet back to the shores of Dalmatia.
This surrender was a great victory for Venice, and the citizens of the 
Republic rejoiced knowing that they had survived the most narrow escape in 
the history of the city. There were great celebrations, and heroes were 
honored for their exploits. This win did not, however, mark the conclusion of 
the war, as their enemy was still harassing the Republic both on land and at
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sea. The Genoan fleet under the command of Marco Maruffo had pulled hack 
to Dalmatia, and the Venetians needed to eliminate this final naval threat to 
their city.
As a result, Vettor Pisani led the campaign to engage and destroy the 
Genoan ships. After a great deal of fruitless searching, he found his 
adversaries and was able to force a battle during early August of 1380. 'Phis 
engagement, fought at the eastern side of the Gulf of Venice, unfortunately 
proved to be a mistake. The Genoan ships were not captured, and Pisani was 
mortally wounded. With Pisani's death, the Venetians turned to Carlo Zeno to 
complete the task of destroying the Germans. Zeno pushed on, trying to trap 
the enemy fleet, but he too was unsuccessful. The Venetians continued to 
pursue Maruffo, but they eventually gave up on the Genoan fleet.
In addition, the Republic also continued to battle with its foes on the 
terra firma, Supplies were still scarce, and the city was suffering from 
shortages of many critical products. The battles with their Paduan enemy, 
the Carrara family, were dragging on, and neither side was able to gain a 
conclusive advantage. Eventually, the Venetians cone luded a proposal with 
the Duke of Austria that allowed them to insure that their mainland 
territories would riot fall under hostile control. Under the terms of this 
agreement, Austria was given control of mainland possessions such as 
Treviso, and Austria agreed to garrison the areas with an army to insure that 
the Paduans would not overrun their new acquisitions.* *(^  Austria complied 
with the terms of this agreement and eventually withdrew from the 
hostilities on May 2, 1381.
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Once Austria had secured the mainland territories, the Paduans realized 
that they would be unable to make any other gains on the terra firma. Padua 
decided it was time to end the hostilities, and entered into negotiations with 
the Republic. The two sides reached an agreement with the assistance of 
Amadeus VI of Savoy, and the powers signed a peace treaty at Turin on 
Augusts, 1381.120
In many respects, this treaty was rather harsh for the Venetians, 
especially in light of the many military victories of the Republic. Venice gave 
up all of her claims to Dalmatia, with the entire area going to the King of 
Hungary. In addition, Venice agreed to pay the Hungarian King an annual fee 
as a reward for recognition of Venetian commercial monopolies within the 
North Adriatic. The Venetians ceded Tcnedos to Savoy, and turned over 
many possessions on the mainland, including Trieste, to the armies of the 
Duke of Austria.*2* The Venetians and the Gcnoans also agreed to refrain 
from any commercial activities at Tana until 1383.
Conclusion of the Thesis: Long-Term Effects. Sources of Venetian Strength
Despite these sacrifices, Venice did receive some important benefits. The 
city had spent a great deal of money in defending itself, and had lost many of 
its most talented citizens in the battles. In return, the Republic regained its 
commercial privileges on the mainland and also recovered its dominant 
position in the trade with Constantinople. On paper, the war may not have 
seemed conclusive. In many respects, both Venice and Genoa seemed to 
emerge in equal positions after all of the fighting had ended.
In reality however, Genoa had been destroyed by the Fourth Genoese
110
War, a conflict also known as the War of Chioggia. Genoa never was able to 
recover, and she suffered through a period of instability which eventually 
ended when the city voluntarily sacrificed its independence to the Kingdom of 
France during the decade following the war. The two old rivals seemed as if 
they would merely resume their battle for the profits of the Kast-Wcst trade, 
but the lucrative riches of the Levantine markets would soon be captured 
almost entirely by Venice. Genoa self-destructed, while the Venetian 
Republic continued its development as one of the most enduring 
governmental systems ever seen in the world.
In conclusion, the period from 1250 through 1381 was a time of great 
challenges for the Venetian Republic. The fact that the city was able to 
survive and prosper in this era was a testimonial to the strengths of the 
people and institutions of the Republic. Certain civic factors such as Venice's 
tradition of shared governance, its high-quality public servants and 
ambassadors, and its unique institutions such as the Council of Ten all helped 
to produce a state that enjoyed great internal stability, 'l his strength allowed 
Venice to resist two major revolutionary attempts during the period in 
question, and also helped Venice to dominate diplomatic relations with other 
nations. Although the government’s numerous committees and checks and 
balances did not provide the fastest means to rule a state, the Republic had a 
remarkably effective system for generating coherent and flexible policies.
The Republican system presented unique challenges, and required many 
committed individuals who were needed to serve in posts ranging from doge 
to admiral to ambasssador. Fortunately for Venice, the city had many
talented men who made great public service contributions, helping to lead the 
city to success during the years of the struggles with Genoa.
Venice also was able to prosper during this time period because of the 
city's great commercial and maritime talents. Venetian strength primarily 
did not result from any natural resources; instead, the Republic was able to 
flourish because Venetians were some of the best merchants and sailors in 
the world. Whether acting as middlemen in trade between the Hast and West, 
or carrying products to European ports in cities such as London or Bruges, the 
Venetians realized that their prosperity rested on their ability to initiate, 
preserve, and defend trading contacts throughout the world. As a result, the 
Republic produced great sailors and admirals, and had unparalclled 
ship-building facilities at the Arsenal. Venice also took special pains to 
maintain diplomatic contacts which preserved valuable commercial privileges.
In this era, Venetian attentions were focused on the waters, not on the 
terra firma of the Italian Peninsula. Of course, Venice had possessions and 
tried to extend its influence on the mainland, but the city knew that its most 
important priorities were the trade routes and markets which it reached in its 
sailing vessels. Venice would grow to become increasingly involved in 
mainland affairs during the course of the next century, but during the time of 
the great struggles with Genoa, the Republic was first and foremost concerned 
with maritime affairs.
These various strengths allowed Venice to overcome its rival of Genoa. 
After generations of fighting and hatred, the Venetians eventually emerged 
victorious. Following the conclusion of the Fourth Genoese War, Venetian
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trade brought the city great wealth and resources. Venice was able to regain 
control over valuable areas in Dalmatia and enjoy the fruits of its Levantine 
trade. In contrast, Genoa self-destructed, weakened by years of internal 
dissention and civil wars.
Thus, the Republic was able to prosper and flourish. Venice, like all 
Italian cities, would be threatened in future centuries by the rise of powerful 
nation-states such as France and England; however, during the thirteenth and 
fourtecth centuries the Republic was one of the strongest powers in the 
world. Military victories of course were important, but Venetian strength 
came more from the commercial and civic contributions of the people of the 
city than anything else. The greatest factors in producing a vibrant nation 
were people like the merchants and seamen, and the prudent civic officals. 
These individuals were the true source of Venetian strength in the struggle 
with Genoa and other foreign affairs during the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries.
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